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This thesis investigates the state’s management of NRMs in Singapore through an in-depth case study of 
its interactions with the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON). The state in 
Singapore plays an active role in managing religion and accords preference to particular forms of religion, 
although not in an overt manner. This is demonstrated through a religion management model and 
historical incidents involving religious movements and by using examples of NRMs which enjoyed 
varying degrees of acceptance from the state. The state manages religious movements through various 
forms of legislation and media campaigns which it has developed and embarked on over the years.  The 
choice of Singapore serves as a suitable exemplar of a dynamic cosmopolitan city state composed of 
people from a variety of religious orientations and governed by an authoritarian state. ISKCON, widely 
accepted as a world rejecting NRM both in Western and Asian societies serves as a good example of a 
classic NRM which emerged  during the counter culture period in the 1960s and has undergone various 
forms of internal and external transformations in its struggle for survival and expansion.  The intersection 
of a new authoritarian state exercising total control over the lives of its citizens who are engaged in 
meeting the state’s sole objective of material prosperity and modernization with that of a new but 
traditional religious movement with monastic inclinations and whose proselytizing methods are 
deliberately of high public visibility promises to be a dramatic encounter. This thesis shows how 
ISKCON, a global NRM, has had to undertake specific performative strategies in response to constraints 
imposed by the state so as to enlarge its social and physical space and adjust its proselytization methods 
to gain acceptance in Singapore. It also illustrates the limited fluidity that religious movements, 
particularly NRMs in Singapore enjoy and the rigid core values of the state borne from the desire for 
economic development and social order.   
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Processes of globalization have enabled the proliferation of new religious movements (NRMs) 
over the past five decades. The boom of NRMs has interacted with other global processes such as 
migration, secularization and desecularization to significantly affect the traditional religious 
landscapes of a number of nation states. Cosmopolitan cities are particularly open to influences 
from NRMs due to migration flows and high population densities which increase their exposure 
to new forms of religion.  Consequently, in some cities, state regulation of religious matters has 
become more diligent in order to circumvent potential religious conflict or anti-social behaviour. 
Some NRMs are perceived by state authorities to be non-conformist and socially detrimental and 
are subject to legal, theological and normative resistance (Nicholas 2007, p. 2). In other cases the 
state holds firm to a policy of non-interference or at times even encourages certain NRMs to take 
root and expand to become a mainstream religion because of the positive social values espoused 
by them. The exact response of the state to NRMs and the latter’s counter reactions are dependent 
on a number of factors such as the socio-political culture of the state and the characteristics of the 
NRM in question. The state-NRM interaction in various societies merits much scholarly research, 
partly because the majority of research on NRMs has focused on issues such as the reasons for 
people joining, ethnographic accounts of their operations, their ideologies and their concomitant 
relationship with the forces of secularization and modernity. This is especially true for non-
Western societies where issues of the political significance of NRMs take precedence because 
‘the liberal democratic assumption of the separation between state and religion is not strongly 
rooted in the political practices of these  societies, and in many cases it receives only lip service’ 
and ‘the pursuit of modernity in many of these societies suggests the need for local governments 
to control religious activities that are potential threats to their programs of industrial 
development’ (Lee 1994, p. 473). 
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This thesis focuses on the interactions between the state of Singapore and the NRMs that have 
emerged and engaged with it. It reviews the philosophy of religious managerialism in Singapore, 
the manner in which the state has managed NRMs and the reactive strategies adopted by the 
latter. An in-depth case study of the interactions between the Singapore state and the International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) will be used to augment the thesis. The choice of 
Singapore serves as a suitable exemplar of a dynamic cosmopolitan city state composed of people 
from a variety of religious orientations and governed by an authoritarian state. Moreover, the 
availability of a range of empirical studies on religiosity in Singapore and the benefit of a rich 
database of the policies of a four decade rule of a single political party renders the Singapore state 
an ideal case study. ISKCON, widely accepted as a world rejecting NRM both in Western and 
Asian societies serves as a good example of a classic NRM which emerged  during the counter 
culture period in the 1960s and has undergone various forms of internal and external 
transformations in its struggle for survival and expansion.  The intersection of a new authoritarian 
state exercising total control over the lives of its citizens who are engaged in meeting the state’s 
sole objective of material prosperity and modernization with that of a new but traditional religious 
movement with monastic inclinations and whose proselytizing methods are deliberately of high 
public visibility promises to be a dramatic encounter. The outcome of this will be narrated in the 
latter parts of this thesis and will be of interest to scholars of religion-state relations, new 
religious movements, public policy and historians of religion. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows: The first section is devoted to providing a historical account of 
the Singapore government’s relationship with mainstream religious movements which is 
discussed chronologically from the nation state’s period of independence in 1965 to the present.  
This section is necessary as the state’s management of mainstream religions would be useful in 
understanding its attitude toward NRMs.  The next section describes the interface between the 
state and NRMs. The experience of movements such as Soka Gakkai, Sai Baba Organization, 
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ISKCON and Jehovah’s Witnesses will be briefly discussed and framed with reference to the 
degree of approval they have been granted from the state.  The third section will be an in-depth 
discussion of state-ISKCON relations, the materials for which were gleaned from academic 
publications on ISKCON, ISKCON publications, participant observation and interviews of 
practitioners.  The history of ISKCON as a worldwide movement, the impact of global ISKCON 
trends on the local movement will discussed, though not in great detail as the focus will be on the 
various forms and phases of interaction between the movement and the state. The final section 













Chapter 2: Religion and the state in Singapore 
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 The Singapore state through its various institutions, takes an unapologetically interventionist 
stance over various spheres of the social and private lives of Singaporeans, exemplified by the 
engineering of campaigns and policies which encourage graduates to marry, speak fluent English 
and Mandarin (as opposed to Chinese dialects) and influence birth rates. The enclosed and 
integrated system of governance in Singapore resonates with Miliband’s definition of the state as 
a supreme central power comprising a set of institutions including the government, the 
legislature, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police and the armed forces (Miliband 1969, p. 46 
cited in Kong (1993, p. 343). Also, Gramsci’s (1973) concept of hegemony aptly describes the 
state’s management of religion by characterizing hegemony as a form of domination which is 
performed in a coercive sense - ‘calibrated coercion’. To stay in power, members of the ruling 
group need to persuade their subjects that they are working for the benefit of the citizens and that 
it is commonsensical and natural for the citizens to assimilate the values espoused by the state 
(Kong 1993, p. 343). Social control imposed by the ruling group is likely to be accepted 
voluntarily by the governed as necessary in order to achieve certain desirable objectives (Chua 
1995, p. 2). Consequently, policies and actions are supported by the majority of the people and 
the power of the ruling group is uncontested. However, as Gramsci notes, such hegemony will 
always be challenged by other groups in society which may express their resistance in overt or 
latent and symbolic forms. Moreover hegemony/consensus tends to weaken once the historical 
conditions that enabled its emergence and consolidation begin to change as a result of the state’s 
policies and external social forces (Chua 1995, p. 3). The political strategy of the ruling group 
must then adjust to the new conditions.  In Singapore the state uses such hegemonic tactics to 
argue that its method of managing diverse religious groups is the most practical and beneficial for 
Singaporeans. Religious groups and individuals respond by either adapting or resisting (Kong 
1993). This section will explore the dynamics of hegemonic state control in Singapore.   
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Regulation of religion in Singapore is chiefly aimed towards the prevention of conflict (Ling 
1987, p. 7). The state officially declares itself to be secular and secularism is advocated as a 
practical approach to manage multi-religiosity in a neutral way (Sinha 1999, p. 81). Singapore 
does not have a history of being aligned with any particular religion due to its being composed of 
people from a wide spectrum of religious traditions and who were mainly natives from Malaya, 
migrants from China and India, and British imperialists. Currently Singapore society continues to 
be characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity, with the population comprising Buddhists 
(42.5%), Taoists (8.5%), Christians (14.6%), Muslims (14.9%), Hindus (4.0%),  other religions 
(0.7%) and 14.8% having no religion (Census 2000 Advanced Data Release). However, the 
statistics do not accurately depict the complex forms of religiousity embraced by some 
Singaporeans who may believe in and practise more than one type of religion, who are closet 
believers or who are members of NRMs. Nevertheless it demonstrates Singapore’s variegated 
demographics, due to which the state embarked on a secular model emphasizing neutrality and 
sensitivity as its underlying principles. 
 
The state’s initiative in establishing a secular polity contrasts with the history of some Western 
societies where the agents of secularization were revolutionaries, scientists, social theorists or 
activists. In fact Singapore is one of a number of post- colonial Asian states which have taken the 
secular option as a way of circumventing the management of the ideological aspects of religious 
affairs.  This trend of state sponsored secularism is mainly due to the impact of nineteenth century 
imperialism which presented Asian states with new forms and models of governance replicated 
and inherited from the West such as the sacred and transcendent principles of national unity. 
Thus, as in Europe, the ‘national essence became the soul of public life, while other beliefs, 
particularly those defined as “religious” were cordoned off to an optional and private realm’ 
(Dubois 2005, p. 119).  This resulted in a condition of absolute authority for the state while 
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freedom of religion was constitutionally assured as long as the latter did not contradict the former. 
This guarantee of freedom of religion subjected to an ideology of state sacrality is visible in most 
Asian constitutions today, albeit with some variation (Dubois 2005, p. 122). The Singapore 
government’s ideological formation has been thoroughly analysed by Chua (1995) and its   model 
of interventionist and experimental secularization has been summarized by Christenson (2007) in 
a chronological four phase typology. I will adopt both models to frame my own analysis. 
 
2.1. Phase 1: Religion in the background (1965-Late 1970s) 
From 1950 to 1969, Singapore experienced three racial riots. The first, in 1950, arose out of 
Malay Muslims’ outrage over a court decision to allow Maria Hertogh, the Eurasian child of 
Roman Catholic parents, fostered by a Malay woman and raised as a Muslim, to be reclaimed by 
her natural father. Accusations of the courts’ bias against Muslims and forced Christian 
conversion of a Muslim surfaced among the local and international Muslim community. The 
confinement of Maria in a Christian convent further aggravated the situation and culminated in 
riots in which eighteen people died and several hundred were injured (Narayanan 2004, p. 44). 
The ‘Maria Hertogh riots’ would later be recounted in the media and national education 
campaigns several times as an example of the disruptive potential of religious conversion 
(Aljunied 2009, p. 1), the insensitivity of the colonial government on local sentiments and the 
need to practise media regulation over matters related to race and religion (Narayanan 2004, p. 
50).  The second series of riots occurred in July and September 1964. The July riots involved a 
Malay procession that marked Prophet Muhammad’s birthday celebrations and turned into inter-
communal violence between Chinese and Malays in which thirty-six people were killed and 563 
were wounded (Hill 2003, p.121). The Singapore Government attributed the riots to agitation by 
ultra nationalist factions in UMNO who pressed Singapore Malays to demand special privileges 
for Malays that were enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution (Narayanan 2004, p. 46). The 
September riots were triggered by the death of a Malay rickshaw driver, believed to have been 
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killed by a group of Chinese. Twelve people were killed and eighty seven injured (Narayanan 
2004, p. 48). The riots were seen to be a reaction to the landing of thirty Indonesian paratroopers 
in Johor on 2 September 1964 during the Konfrontasi period.  Finally the third series of riots took 
place in 1969. This was a spillover of race riots in Malaysia in which indigenous Malays 
interpreted election results as a threat to their traditional position. Four people were killed and 
eighty wounded (Hill 2003, p. 121).  
 
The trauma of the abovementioned race riots and battles with communalistic policies during the 
merger with Malaysia persuaded the Singapore Government to take a conservative stance on 
matters related to race and religion. Hill (2004, p. 343) explains how these incidents have 
contributed to fostering policy on religious issues: 
These events have led to a strong sense of precariousness among the political 
elite, which has attempted to instill this ethos in an increasingly prosperous 
population. The result is a ‘crisis mentality’ by means of which the elite 
periodically reminds its citizens of the traumatic origins of the state and presents 
a Hobbesian scenario through the largely government controlled media in an 
attempt to legitimate its policies of social control.   
Besides this, since Singapore is a Chinese majority state surrounded by Malay-Muslim powers, 
any policies favouring or disadvantaging a particular race was perceived to be a threat to survival. 
To obviate this, the state rejected any identification with Chineseness despite its majority Chinese 
population and pursued the path of secular modernism (Christensen 2007, p. 2). The commitment 
to this brand of secularism was visibly pronounced in the national pledge crafted by then Foreign 
Minister S. Rajaratnam: 
We, the citizens of Singapore, pledge ourselves as one united people, regardless 
of race, language or religion, to build a democratic society based on justice and 
equality so as to achieve happiness, prosperity and progress for our nation. 
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Personal and collective aspirations of Singaporeans were refashioned in secular rather than 
religious terms (Christensen 2007, p.3). State-run programmes of secularization aimed to diffuse 
communal tensions by ensuring people would increasingly conduct themselves in terms of secular 
values as opposed to religious ones. Meritocracy and multiracialism were promulgated as core 
principles in nation building and a neutral social space, where personal material aspirations could 
be fulfilled in non-racial and non-religious terms, was set up (Christensen 2007, p. 5).  In the 
immediate aftermath of the separation from Malaysia in 1965, the need for survival was 
emphasized and the pursuit of material education and economic progress were established as 
vanguards of nation-building, effectively relegating religion to the backdrop of private space. The 
historically determined condition at that time was conceptualized by the state as an issue of 
‘survival of the nation’ that could only be resolved by capitalist industrial development. The 
ideology of survival served as the basic concept for rationalisation of state policies in the 
economic and social spheres (Chua 1995, p. 4). Therefore the industrialization of Singapore, the 
establishment of compulsory military service for males, and the transformation of communal 
based housing to racially mixed housing units, all served to bring together Singaporeans of all 
races and religions under common spaces and enable them to pursue purely secular goals, 
neutering expressions of religiosity. This is not to say that religion was not given any importance, 
rather it was compartmentalized and shelved to ensure that it did not impede economic 
development. The acting Minister for Social Affairs’ comment that ‘religious leaders provide the 
correct leadership and guidance in religious matters and ensure that the principles and precepts 
were not misinterpreted to become impediments to national progress’ is emblematic of the 
prevailing mood (The Straits Times, 25 January 1978). During this period, the government ended 
the practise of teaching catechism during the regular school day in local schools that had been 




2.2 .Phase 2: Religion in the foreground (Late 1970s to late 1980s) 
Although religion had been accorded a less important role in the former phase, the state had 
always reserved the rights and space for Singaporeans to practise their officially approved 
religions. For example, two annual holidays have been granted for each of the four main 
religious/racial groups, implying an accommodation of the diverse religions and their equal 
treatment (the exception is Hinduism where only Deepavali has been recognised as a holiday; 
Vesak Day which is regarded as the other official ‘Indian’ holiday is predominantly celebrated by 
Chinese Buddhists). In the second phase, religion would occupy a more central role as the counter 
cultural phenomenon which burgeoned in the US in the 1970s had a deep impact on Singapore 
leaders and persuaded them to harness its potential in a direct way. Singapore leaders were aware 
that since Singapore had chosen to embark on a development model founded on secularized, de-
racialized principles with a single-minded goal towards the pursuit of material wealth and that 
English was taught as first language in schools, it was vulnerable to imported cultural influences, 
including counter-cultural elements regarded as less desirable. The sole dependence on human 
resources for the survival of Singapore further heightened this fear.  Christenson noted that 
‘secularization was no longer viewed as the answer to, but rather as the danger to modernization’ 
and that the Singapore Government observed that secular modernism led to hedonism and a 
degradation of social mores and embarked on a campaign against what it perceived to be 
elements of the counter culture phenomenon in its own soil (Christenson 2007, p. 6). The 
Government began a propaganda war against foreign hippies who were depicted as ‘promiscuous, 
anarchic, effete, drug addicted, and self indulgent’ (Tamney 1996, p. 25). Foreign men with 
hippy-like appearance were disallowed from passing through the airport and posters were put up 




Moreover, the ideology of pragmatism and economic instrumentalism began to wane in the 
beginning of the 1980s, as one of its ‘constituent values, individualism became a target of PAP’s 
ideological concerns’ and poor results in the elections signified public dissatisfaction with the 
PAP’s authoritarianism  (Chua 1995, p. 10). Individualism which was promoted in the early years 
of industrialisation became a negative value in the state’s ideological configuration as it ‘tends to 
produce a sense of hypersubjectivity at the expense of commonality with others, implying an 
unwillingness to make self-sacrifice for the social good’ and ‘politically, it may lead to the 
demand for enshrinement of individual rights, which in turn will provide the political and 
ideological space for individuals to translate their own social disadvantages into welfare claims 
on the state’ (Chua 1995, p. 26). This contrasted with earlier views where individualism was seen 
to be an essential characteristic to motivate Singaporeans and meritocracy was emphasized to 
encourage individuals in the pursuit of excellence and to legitimise social inequalities as the 
natural outcome of individual differences in ability (Chua 1995, p. 27).  
 
The state sought to bring religion back to the public sphere to counter the negative influence of 
western modernization and individualism. Arguing that Singapore had been infected by the West, 
then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew suggested that the ‘antidote’ was the ‘strong assertion of the 
Asian values common to all Singapore ethnic groups, stressing the virtues of individual 
subordination to the community so as to counteract the  individualism of western liberalism’ (Hill 
2000, p. 185). The concept of ‘Asian Values’ which especially refers to a neo-Confucian ethos, 
emerged from Western social scientific domains and were ironically adopted by Asian leaders in 
their nation-building process (Sai and Huang 1999, p. 164 quoted in Hill 2000). Also, under a 
backdrop of declining Western investments and an ascending Japanese economic power, the 
concept of ‘Asian values’ served to rehabilitate Singaporean minds into accepting investments 
from their wartime occupiers (Hill 2000, p. 184). Thus in 1979, ‘neo-Confucianism’, a 
sociological rationalization of Western decline and Japanese ascendency in the world economy of 
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the 1970s emerged as possible antidote (Christensen 2007, p.7).    An ethos combining values 
such as self-discipline, frugality, hardwork, filial piety and obediance to social authority was 
celebrated as the pillar of success for the East Asian economies. Simultaneously the decline of the 
Protestant ethic was purported to be the cause of American decline.  
 
Lee Kuan Yew espoused the view  that ‘Confucian ethics, Malay traditions, and the Hindu ethos 
must be combined with sceptical Western methods of scientific inquiry, the open discursive 
methods in the search for the truth’ and that students ‘must be made to place group interests 
above individual interests (Straits Times, 15 March 1979 cited in Chua 1995, p. 28). In 1984 the 
state introduced a compulsory ‘Religious Knowledge’ programme in schools which encouraged 
Singaporeans to preserve their cultural heritage (Pereira 2005, p. 171). The following subjects 
were offered – Bible knowledge (Roman Catholic and Protestant), Buddhist Studies, Hindu 
studies, Islamic Religious Knowledge, Sikhism and Confucian Ethics. Confucianism was added 
as an afterthought for Chinese who might not be religiously inclined (Kuo 1992, cited in Hill 
(2000, p. 186)).   Then Prime Minister Lee explained ‘Our task is to implant these traditional 
values into our children when their minds are young and receptive, so that [….] these attitudes 
harden and are forged for a lifetime’ (quoted in Chua 1995, p. 160). Hill and Lian (1995) 
highlight the rationalization of Buddhism in the Religious Knowledge programme as an example 
of the state’s attempt to utilize religion for its nation building project: 
…the Buddhist teachings are translated into values such as self-reliance, 
tolerance, loving-kindness, and compassion. The textbook treats ritualism, so 
vital a part of Buddhist culture, in a negative manner. 
 (Kuah 1991, p. 34  cited in Hill and Lian[1995]) 
The religious and ethical ideologies that were promoted were expected to have these modern 
attributes: support for capitalism, tolerance of other creeds, compatibility with universalistic 
norms, and a modern view of women; traits considered to be prerequisities for economic 
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development (Tamney 1996, p. 26).  Additionally, during the 1980s to 1990s, the Straits Times 
regularly published information of different religions and their festivals. 
 
During this phase religion was no longer viewed as a fundamental threat to social order and 
economic prosperity. While the state remained committed to a neutral stance in relation to 
religious diversity, it no longer adopted a neutral stance towards religion.  Religion was 
considered the cultural ‘software’ which must be ‘programmed’ into Asian minds in order to 
uphold traditional Asian values of responsibility and thrift in the face of the frivolous 
‘Westernization’ (Lee 1979). If the state encouraged citizens to conduct their lives in terms of 
their religious traditions, it is because, these religious traditions constitute the cultural foundation 
of social order and economic prosperity in modernizing Asian society; they are promoted - as 
long as they contribute to political stability, social order and economic productivity (Christenen 
2007, p. 9).  The role of religion as a force for social development is not unique to Singapore. The 
experiences of several modernized states of Asia demonstrate that religious faith can be very 
much a part of the fabric of modernization, rather than something alien to it (Goh 2005). McGrath 
(2004) points to the example of South Korea where Christianity came to be identified as a 
modernizing and democratic social force and served as pillar for social reform (quoted in Kluver 
and Cheong 2007). The state-sponsored renewal of religion in Singapore however was short-lived 
due to unexpected consequences.  
 
2.3. Phase 3: Religion under the spotlight (Late 1980s to 2000) 
In June 1987, the Singapore government announced that it had detained four Malays who were 
involved in Malay martial arts groups and Islamic education, under the Internal Security Act for 
spreading rumours of impending racial clashes (Hill 2003, p. 120). Later in the same year, in an 
infamous episode labelled as ‘the Marxist conspiracy’, state officials detained sixteen Catholic 
activists for having ‘subversive’ association with leftist ideologies. Some of them were also 
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caught making contact with an opposition political party. The state invoked the Internal Security 
Act to detain them without trial (The Straits Times, 27 May 1987). The Archbishop of the 
Catholic Church was warned by the Minister of Home Affairs that certain Catholic organizations 
were being used for subversive political ends and that the Government does not tolerate the 
invasion of political space by religious bodies (Tong 2007, p. 239). Incidentally, this occurred in 
the aftermath of the deposing of the former President of Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 
with Catholic support. In his National Day Message in 1987, Lee emphasized that religion must 
not get involved in politics and that the proper role of religious groups is to practice charity and 
perform community work, such as setting up childcare centres (Tamney 1996, p. 32).  
 
Reeling from the effects of the aforementioned incidents, perceived increased religiosity and 
evangelisation, the state realised that enthusiasm for religion was expressed in unintended ways 
by the Asian values programme. Subsequently, in 1989, the Religious Knowledge programme in 
schools was terminated and from 1992 onwards, was replaced by a civics/moral education 
program which would incorporate aspects of nation-building, an awareness of our shared values, 
and an appreciation of the beliefs and practices of various religions and races in Singapore’ (The 
Straits Times, 1 June 1989, p. 26).1  Furthermore, in 1990, the Maintenance of Religious 
Harmony Act (MRHA) was passed to monitor religious matters and to prevent religious 
organizations from being used for political purposes.  Under this act, those who ‘mix religion 
with politics’ or criticize other religions or criticize the President or Government would be issued 
a restraining order forbidding them from addressing any congregation or group on any subject 
and from holding office in any editorial board or committee related to their religious publications 
                                                     
1 Based on a report on religious revivalism by three National University of Singapore sociologists that had 
been commissioned by the Ministry of Community Development (Kuo, et al. 1988), the Government also 
acknowledged that the programme had been partial in the choice of specific religions and the choice of 
particular ideological stances within the various theological stances  in the course options and that making 
Religious Knowledge compulsory was inconsistent with the secular ideology of the state (Tan 1997, pp. 
616 - 617). 
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(The Straits Times, 12 May 2001; Tamney 1996, p. 36). Referring to the Maria Hertogh riots, the 
Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Wong Kan Seng, said that this law was a better alternative than 
prosecuting individuals in court because ‘when a case goes to court, many things come out in the 
open….things that may be said or evidence that needs to be adduced, might incite further ill-
feelings’ (The Straits Times, 12 May 2001). Those who violate the order can be convicted in 
court and made to pay a maximum fine of $10 000 or face up to two years’ jail or both.  The 
MRHA also defines the ideal role of religion in Singapore: 
The various faiths practiced by Singaporeans are a source of spiritual strength 
and moral guidance to them. Many religions are engaged in educational, 
community and social work, running schools, helping the aged and the 
handicapped, and operating creches for children. 
 (Maintenance of Religious Harmony. Cmd. 21 of 1989, p. 6). 
The MRHA was almost invoked in the following incidents. In 1992, an Islamic religious leader 
was warned by the authorities for urging Muslims to vote for Muslim candidates with deep 
religious beliefs during the 1991 General Elections (The Straits Times, 12 May 2001).  A 
Christian pastor was also warned in 1992 for using his church publications and the pulpit to 
criticize Buddhism, Taoism and Catholicism (The Straits Times, 12 May 2001). In 1995, when 
one of the deities of the Hindu pantheon, Ganesha was believed to be drinking the milk that was 
offered to him, a Muslim cleric who declared that it was not a miracle but the work of Satan, was 
promptly censured by the authorities (The Straits Times, 12 May 2001). 
 
Besides the MRHA, other forms of legislation were implemented that could be ‘used as part of 
the enforcement arsenal in dealing with individuals and groups in the religious realm that pose a 
public order threat’ (Tan 2008, p. 63). These are 1) the Societies Act (Cap. 311) 2) Penal code 
and Sedition Act and 3) the Internal Security Act (ISA). Under the Societies Act, all registered 
societies are expected to adhere to a given body of rules and their stated mission and objectives 
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should not threaten national interests and disturb public peace in any way (Sinha 2008, p. 148). 
Should it be perceived to be the case, the society in question could be de-registered. The Penal 
Code and Sedition Act prosecutes criminal offences relating to religion including ‘injuring or 
defiling a place of worship, disturbing a religious assembly by uttering words or sounds to 
deliberately wound religious feelings and promoting feelings of ill-will and hostility between 
different races or classes of the population of Singapore’ (Tan 2008, p. 64). In 2005, three 
bloggers were convicted under the Sedition Act for posting Web-blog comments that were anti-
Muslim (Tan 2008, p. 64) and in 2009 a couple were charged under the same act for distributing 
tracts that cast Mohammed, the prophet of Islam, in a negative light. Finally, the ISA allows for 
preventive detention for renewable two-year periods where ‘it is necessary to do so’ to prevent a 
person from acting in any manner prejudicial to Singapore’s security and the maintenance of 
public order (Tan 2008, p. 64).    
 
As expressed by Tan (2008, p. 62) ‘religious liberty in Singapore is subject to the belief-action 
distinction: religious beliefs are protected but actions motivated by such beliefs, and which are 
contrary to Singapore’s laws, are not protected.’  In other words, it is not illegal to profess any 
faith; however, the manner of carrying out activities related to the faith, especially if they are 
perceived to threaten racial and religious harmony may be circumscribed. The state’s view is that 
‘mutual abstention from competitive political influence is an important aspect of religious 
tolerance and harmony’ (MRHA 1990). This is based on the premise that when one or more 
religious groups try to exert their influence on society through the acquisition of political power, 
others may react by following suit, resulting in a society demarcated along religious lines and 
divided by religious conflict.  The state also takes a stern view of members of one religious group  
criticizing another. Religious conduct which may cause ‘feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or 
hostility between different religious groups’ is explicitly turned into a crime punishable by law 
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(MRHA 1990). Religion should ideally be conducted in a manner that supports and strengthens 
the secular goals of development. 
 
2.4. Phase 4: Religion in the danger zone (Late 2001 to present) 
After a relatively low profile in the public scene throughout the 1990s, the 2001 September 11 
attacks again propelled religion into the spotlight, this time as a security issue. In August 2002,  
local members of the Al-Qaeda linked terrorist network Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) were arrested and 
a few weeks later, four Muslim girls were suspended from school  for violating  rules on school 
uniform  by wearing the tudung (Malay term for headscarf). Although the ban on wearing the 
tudung in government schools was not new, the issue escalated into a matter of the highest state 
concern. Complex debates which revolved around the concepts of common space versus private 
space and religiosity versus secularism ensued in parliament following the highly dramatized 
incidents. One Member of Parliament (MP) lamented that  Singapore Muslims ‘are retreating into 
their own comfort zones’ and called on them ‘for the sake of strengthening social cohesion […] 
not to set themselves apart from the rest of Singapore’  (The Straits Times, 21 Jan 2003). Another 
argued that religion fundamentally ‘affects our social togetherness’ – and observes that ‘over the 
last few years, many of us have noticed practices which differentiate rather than promote closer 
integration. Our Muslim Singaporeans should relook those practices’ (The Straits Times, 21 Jan 
2003). The then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in his 2002 National Day Rally Speech, narrated 
his own experience of a number of Muslim grassroots leaders who ‘had declined to join a dinner 
function in a restaurant even though halal food would be served. The reason? The restaurant 
served alcohol’ (Goh 2002a).  
 
The outcome of the debates was that definitions of common space which emphasized Singapore’s 
secular boundaries were communicated to the public. One definition espoused common space as a 
space of universalist equality and neutrality, a space where Singaporeans of all races, religions 
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and languages can interact (Christensen 2007, p.11). The school was enounced as one of the 
hallmarks of common space where ‘young Singaporeans mix, study and play together, without 
being conscious of their race, religion or social status’ (Goh 2002b). By donning the tudung the 
Muslim girls concerned introduced a marker of distinction, religious in nature, into the uniform 
commonness of school space. Furthermore, the notion of common space was reinforced in 
October 2002, after a second round of JI arrests, when Goh proposed a ‘Code on Religious 
Harmony’ providing all religions with a set of behavioural guidelines expected of them in a 
secular, multi-racial and multi-religious society (Christensen 2007, p. 12). Echoing the spirit of 
the National pledge, it reads:  
We, the citizens of Singapore, acknowledging that we are a secular society; 
enjoying the freedom to practice our own religion; and recognizing that religious 
harmony is a cornerstone of our peace, progress and prosperity; hereby resolve to 
practice our religion in a manner that: promotes the cohesion and integration of 
our society; expands the common space of Singaporeans; encourages mutual 
tolerance, understanding, respect, confidence and trust; fosters stronger bonds 
across religious communities; and prevents religion from ever being a source of 
conflict.   
(Goh 2002c) 
 
The Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Dr. Yacoob Ibrahim expressed the need to extend 
values practised in common space to the private domain:  
What we do in our places of worship is entirely our business. But if what we do 
and preach in our private space creates more barriers and threatens our common 
space, we would all agree that we have a problem. Hence I think that it is more 
important to focus not so much on the idea of separate spaces but on the things 
that bring these spaces together into coherence. The values that permeate the 
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common space must also be operating in the private spaces. If we are to respect 
diversity in our common space, then we should also teach and practice this value 
in our private space. 
(Yacoob 2002a) 
Respect for diversity and diversity itself are celebrated as positive values contributing to a shared 
social space:  ‘As we give space for diversity and accord it the respect it deserves, we bring 
different people much closer together…the key is to understand that different groups bring 
different things to the common space’ (Yaacob 2002b).  
 
The state’s role was not limited to rhetoric. Adhering to its interventionist role, the state initiated 
a number of projects such as ‘Inter-Racial Confidence Circles’ (2002), ‘Harmony Circles’ (2002) 
‘Community Engagement Programme’ (2006) to promote inter-religious harmony (Christensen 
2007, p. 15). The openly stated goal of the last programme is to create sufficient inter-racial and 
inter-religious trust and confidence for Singapore’s social fabric to be capable of withstanding a 
terrorist attack.  The mainstream media frequently celebrated cases where religious communities 
cooperate with one another and even share common space. For example one newspaper article 
featured an Anglican pastor who said, ‘when I visit other religious institutions, I can respect the 
way they express their attempts to seek God – a quest common to all mankind’ (The Straits 
Times, April 4, 2008). However Mathew’s interview of 183 clergymen in Singapore showed that 
nearly fifty percent had expressed apprehension in engaging with other religions through 
interfaith dialogue and tended to maintain an exclusivist stance (Mathews 2008, p. 571- 605). 
Thus the state engages in the construction of an image of the ideal religion as one that is 
respectful of other religions, tolerant and benevolent towards mankind in general.  
Simultaneously those who are deemed to threaten religious harmony by acts such as aggressive 
proselytization continue to be castigated. An example of this was when in 2008, two Chinese 
Christians were charged under the Sedition Act and Undesirable Publication Act for distributing a 
 20
‘seditious publication’ which criticized the Prophet Muhammad (The Straits Times, April 15, 
2008). 
 
It is clear that while the state expects religion not to intrude into what it demarcates as ‘common 
space’ it has no intention of letting religion unfold in its own private spaces. In fact as 
Christensen (2007, p.15) notes,  ‘religious believers are no longer simply enjoined to practice 
their faith in a tolerant and rationalized way adapted to the multi-religious and modernizing 
conditions of Singapore. They are enjoined to practice their faith in way which builds social trust 













Chapter 3: The Religion Management Model and the 
management of NRMS 
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3.1. The Religion Management Model 
According to the constitution of Singapore, every person has the right to profess and practise his 
or her religion and to propagate it. Every religious group has the right to manage its own religious 
affairs, to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes, and to acquire 
and own property and to hold and administer it in accordance with law. Religious groups also 
have the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children and to provide 
instruction in their own religion, but there must be no discrimination on the grounds of religion in 
any law relating to such institutions.  Although the constitution is mostly honoured, I have shown 
through the various phases of management of religion in Singapore‘s history that the state is 
prepared to suppress, exploit, control or mould religion or religious groups to achieve its 
objective of economic development and social stability. State officials have on many occasions 
explicitly voiced the need to regulate religious movements in a way that renders them 
complementary to wider national interests (Wee 1989, p. 7-9). As observed by Wee (1989, p. 7-
20) and Clammer (1991, p. 11-17), the state has through hegemonic methods granted itself the 
legal and political power to exercise control over religion in Singapore. Based on these 
observations and the historical instances discussed previously, it can be inferred that religious 
groups are directly or indirectly accorded preferential social space by the state. Indirect 
designation occurs because of the existing legal framework which compels religious movements 
to adjust themselves accordingly without active interference by the state. Direct designation 
occurs when the state utilises punitive measures to exercise control over particular religious 
groups or individuals who fail to negotiate their position successfully at the first stage. The 
resultant range of state-religion relationships could be represented by four generic categories 
shown below.  


































Fig. 1: The state’s religion management model 
 
The horizontal axis represents the degree to which a religious group(s) is perceived by the state to 
affect economic development, ranging from positive effects on the left to negative effects on the 
right. During Phase 2 mentioned in the previous chapter, Confucian ethics such as frugality, self-
discipline and collectivism were thought to be favourable to economic development and were 
promoted by the state. Confucianism would therefore occupy a space on the left of the axis.  The 
vertical axis represents the degree to which a religious group(s) is perceived by the state to affect 
social order, with ‘high’ social order at the top and ‘low’ social order at the bottom of the axis. 
Religious groups which are critical of other religions or politicize their actions would fall in the 
lower end of the scale of social order or at the bottom of the axis. On the other hand, religions 
which are respectful of other religions, tolerant and accepting of the existing socio-political 
establishment would occupy the high end.  The position which a particular religious group 
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occupies due to the combination of the binary measures set up in this framework is not fixed; 
rather it is fluid especially in the long run, depending largely on the Singapore government’s 
perceptions and how the religious group performs. Religious groups are capable of renegotiating 
and adapting themselves to local sociopolitical conditions; this will be discussed in greater detail 
below. The four quadrants – state promoted, state monitored, state approved and state repressed – 
represent broad categories ascribed to religious groups according to their relationship with the 
state. Using examples of religion related controversies mentioned in the previous section and the 
experience of NRMs in Singapore, I will demonstrate that a religious group is ascribed a status 
according to its perceived effects on economic development and social solidarity. This is not to 
say that other factors are not involved but these stand out in prominence within the socio political 
context of Singapore.  
 
The first quadrant ‘State Promoted’ encapsulates the promotion of religious groups or values 
through policies such as the Religious Knowledge Programme taught in schools in Phase 2 or 
celebrating them in the state controlled media, an example being the Anglican priest who 
respected diversity in Phase 4. Public space is accorded to them in the form of physical 
geographical space, media space, educational space, tax benefits for donors and so on. They are 
given the freedom to proselytize, educate and nurture society within the boundaries set out for 
them. The second quadrant ‘state approved’ refers to a neutral approach by the state towards the 
groups housed in this category; although they are given approval to exist and expand, there is no 
indication that the state supports them. Religious movements which are perceived to make little 
or no contribution to economic development while simultaneously having a positive or at least a 
innocuous  influence on social order are likely to belong to this category. Basically, the state does 
not promote or suppress these religions. Often syncretic folk religions which are ritualistic in 
nature feature in this group.  Taoism and Hindu folk religion are examples. They are not deemed 
to be a threat to social order because they do not proselytize and in fact merge physical and social 
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spaces with other religions (Sinha 2003). The ‘State Monitored’ category covers religions which 
are under the watchful eyes of state-run apparatus like the Internal Security Department (ISD) and 
official religious governing bodies such as MUIS. The appointment of a ‘Minister in charge of 
Muslim Affairs’ serves to be an example of state monitoring. The state perceives religious 
movements under this category be potentially dangerous. Generally, those religions which are 
exclusivist and actively proselytize fall in this category. The final category of ‘State Repressed’ 
encompasses religions which are repressed by an arsenal of legislative measures and portrayed to 
be folk devils to engineer moral panics. The state engineers ‘moral panic’ by constructing myths 
‘framed around the notion of the state’s precariousness, in order to legitimate government policies 
and to mobilize social action, especially with the goal of creating consensus’ (Hill 2003, p. 125). 
Myths here do not imply fabrication of the scenarios presented but rather refer to the emphasis of 
their content in legitimating political policy and in initiating social action (Hill 1997). Religious 
groups which are perceived to pose a serious security threat or which are believed to have the 
potential to break the socio-political foundations on which the state had strived to establish fall in 
this category. The JI arrests and Tudung Controversy in Phase 4 are instances of state repression.   
 
The validity of the religion management model can be adequately tested by the state’s 
management of NRMs for three reasons. First, NRMs being new to the local environment mostly 
do not have a large base of external social and political support that older religions enjoy. The 
state therefore is unlikely to be pressured or influenced to accommodate them because of 
international pressure. Second, NRMs at their inception generally do not have a sufficient number 
of local members to exert a substantial influence over civic society and public policy. 
Consequently, they are likely to be evaluated and accorded social space by virtue of their own 
‘merit’ or characteristics.  The absence of external push factors makes it easier to relate the 
treatment meted out to a religious group to the particular characteristics it is perceived to possess. 
Third, NRMs being ‘new’ are not likely to be as fragmented as older religious traditions, making 
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them easier to research. An analysis of the state-NRM relationship would also put the state’s 
claims of neutrality towards all religions to the test. Moreover, the emergence and influence of 
NRMs in Singapore is likely to gain more prominence with globalization. The geographical 
location of Singapore, and its reputation as a financial and technological hub, channels much 
religious traffic to routinely visit its shores (Sinha 2008, p. 162).  Religious leaders are likely to 
stop over to deliver lectures, meet with their followers in Singapore and raise funds, en route to 
North America, Europe or parts of Asia, thereby building a base in Singapore. The large influx of 
foreign workers also contributes to the growth of NRMs as they may either belong to NRMs prior 
to arriving in Singapore or join them while they are here as part of ‘cultural transition’, a concept 
coined by Brown (1992, p. 35) to describe a period of adjustment for international migrants to 
establish networks, build churches and so on. Discussions of NRM and state relations must be 
however be preceded by a clear definition of the term ‘NRM’ which has traditionally been a 
problematic concept.  
 
The term NRM was coined by social scientists to distance themselves from the pejorative use of 
labels like ‘cults’ and ‘sects’ by some Christian groups and anti-cult activists  to describe a range 
of religious movements which emerged in the US and UK in recent times (Introvigne 2001). 
Scholars have subsequently attempted to define NRMs by ascribing certain characteristics to 
them, such as specific time periods as starting points from which ‘new’ religions emerged. 
Arweck (2002, p. 265)  defines NRMs to be  religious groups and movements which have 
emerged mainly since the Second World War and which have come to prominence in Western 
societies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Melton and Moore (1982), and others like Beckford 
(1985) and Nelson (1987) suggest that the real mushrooming of new religious movements came 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Barker (1989, p. 9) maintains that ‘the term new religious movement 
should be used to cover a disparate collection of organisations, most of which have emerged in 
their present form since the 1950s…’. Given that there are differences of opinion over what ‘new’ 
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in new religious movements constitutes, there is a need to redefine the usage of the term in a local 
context.  
 
In Singapore, new religions have mainly been imported from outside rather than having emerged 
indigenously. Some of these may have arrived much later than their initial inception in the 
countries of origin. Soka Gakkai which formed in Japan in the 1930s, but initiated a presence in 
Singapore in 1960 through a Japanese expatriate and the Jehovah’s Witnesses which originated in 
the 19th century in the US but surfaced in Singapore much later are examples of these. These 
movements should nonetheless be referred to as NRMs due to the newness of their ideology and 
practices in relation to the traditional religious landscape which was more or less defined by 
colonial powers in the modern era. Moreover, from a phenomenological point of view, it makes 
sense that the NRM tag should be used from the time when the religious group first emerged in 
Singapore rather than when it was founded. Thus I propose that it would be appropriate to 
designate as NRMs those religious movements which emerged after the independence period of 
the 1960s and which had discernable differences in practice and philosophy from established 
religions in Singapore.  
 
Beckford’s (1985) framework of situating NRMs in the context of the relationship between 
movements and members and between the movements and their host societies is particularly 
applicable in making sense of the state-NRM interactions in Singapore. This is because it 
accounts for sensitivity to diverse and changing relationships.  Other typologies such as that of 
Wilson (1966), Wallis (1984), and Anthony and Robbins (1982), tended to focus on NRMs’ 
response to the world based on their values and teachings.  On the other hand, Beckford’s 
framework ‘insists on the need to take seriously the patterns of social relationships through which 
NRMs are active in society’ and highlights ‘public controversies’ as an important instance of such 
activity (Beckford 1985, p. 82). This is not to say that a focus on the teachings and values are not 
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important, but they should be analysed with respect to actual applied practices within specific 
environments.  Beckford’s framework is reproduced below and will be referred to in the 















The vertical axis (internal) represents the relationship between members and movement while the 
horizontal (external) represents the relationship between the movement and society.  The devotee 
label on the vertical axis is consigned to those who devote themselves fully to the promotion of 
their movement’s values, teachings, and material security. Relations with people who are not 
fellow members are attenuated. The devotee relationship is further characterised by submission to 
an authority having dominion over virtually all aspects of life including the member’s material 
conditions (Beckford 1985 p. 82). The adept ‘combines a high degree of commitment to an NRM 
with periods of involvement in kinship, affectual, economic and occupational relations extending 
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beyond its boundaries’ while the client ‘accepts whatever the movements are offering – wisdom, 
skills, therapy, friendship – on a contractual basis with very limited assumptions about the 
movements’ impact on the conduct of their life’ (Beckford 1985, p. 83).  Patrons are those who 
do not take up positions of responsibility but contribute by offering moral support, material 
assistance and occasional advice for services.  
 
As for the external mode of insertion in society, refuge refers to cases where the NRM disengage 
from society and few attempts are made to reform the outside world. The success of the 
movement is not measured by numbers or material prosperity, ‘unless they occur in conjunction 
with spiritual achievements corresponding to utopian ideals’ (Beckford 1985, p. 85-87). Some 
early ISKCON congregations where entry into monkhood was encouraged and temple and farm 
communities were the norm is an example of a refuge relationship with society. Complex systems 
of initiations and organizational secrecy can also enable movements like Children of God which 
maintain daily contact with the external world for their subsistence to retain their utopian ideals 
and achieve a refuge label (Beckford 1985, p. 86). Revitalization refers to a deliberate attempt to 
transform important social processes and institutions through the application of distinctive values 
rooted in comprehensive meaning-systems (Beckford 1985, p. 87). A balance must be sought 
between confronting society and compromising with it by working with existing arrangements. 
The Unification Church’s numerous businesses, institutes and academies through which it plans a 
revitalization of society serves as an example. NRMs espousing revitalization may eventually 
exert considerable influence on their host societies and therefore be thought capable of creating 
serious problems of a politico-legal nature (Beckford 1985, p. 87- 89). The final category release 
refers to NRMs which specialize in offering to release people from conditions allegedly 
obstructing the full realization of their potential. The sale and delivery of ‘release’ services often 
mark the conclusion of the relationship between the movement and the client and success is 
directly assessed in terms of sales and performance (Beckford 1985, p. 89). NRMs like 
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Scientology, Transcendental Meditation, and the Rajneesh Foundation which espouse the 
effective use of knowledge, skills or techniques to increase human capacity to lead supposedly 
fulfilling lives are good examples. It should be noted that it is possible for a single NRM to 
simultaneously have several modes of insertion in society in accordance with its particular 
interaction with the external world in different circumstances and times and with different ways 
of managing its members. As Beckford points out, any given movement can display more than 
one combination of internal and external relationships at any time, and changes in their 
configuration can often be observed (Beckford 1985, p. 78). He also adds that the changing 
fortune of NRMs could be due to general shifts in public sentiment or taste (Beckford 1985, p. 
79). Next, the experience of NRMs in the interventionist state of Singapore will be discussed in 
the context of Beckford’s framework and the religion management model.  
 
3.2. State Promoted: Soka Gakkai  
When Soka Gakkai first established itself in Singapore in the 1970s, it had about five to seven 
members. Currently, its membership has increased to over forty thousand households (Tong 
2007, p. 134). It has also participated in the National Day Parade and Chingay festival for many 
years, often putting up the most popular displays. Soka’s success was due to it actively adapting 
to the state’s objectives at different times and to its internal belief system (Koh 2009, p. 32). Soka 
has a world affirming orientation which resonated with the state’s ideology of pragmatism and 
preference for rationalized religion (Teng 1997, p. 24). It also appealed to the people’s desire for 
canonical religion. The strategies it adopted to gain acceptance by the state are noteworthy. 
 
To adapt to the socio-political situation in Singapore, Soka Gakkai altered various aspects of its 
traditions and practices. First, the traditional method of proselytizing known as shakubuku which 
refers to a ‘harsh, head-on debate and refutation of another’s religion’ was replaced by a less 
aggressive, softer and friendlier method which had also gained ascendency in Japan (Teng 1997, 
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p. 43). Second, unlike the situation in Japan, where Soka Gakkai is very much integrated with the 
political scene through its connection to the Komeito political party, the movement assiduously 
avoided any political involvement in Singapore (Tong 2007, p. 154; Teng 1997, p. 44). Instead 
Soka Gakkai Singapore presented itself as a cultural group, even naming its headquarters the 
‘Cultural Centre’ (Tong 2007, p. 154; Koh 2009, p. 32). This coincides with Singapore’s very 
own cultural renaissance depicted in Phase 2 where the state sought to actively programme its 
citizens with ‘cultural software’ (Lee 1979).  Furthermore Soka Gakkai Japan is often viewed as 
an exclusivist religion but in Singapore, the group emphasized peaceful co-existence with other 
major religions in Singapore (Tong 2007, p. 154). In March 2008, it hosted a ‘Youth for Peace 
Interfaith Symposium’ which was attended by Singapore’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Another 
feature of  Soka is that it did not seek to disrupt established rituals.  For example, while it does 
not officially support ancestor worship which is a common practice among Chinese Taoists, the 
group tolerated the practice among its members (Tong 2007, p. 155).  Tong (2007, p. 155) argues 
that the ability of Soka to ‘indigenize presenting itself not as Japanese religion, but rather as 
Buddhism, and in the process not be seen as an “alien religion” has contributed to its success in 
Singapore.’ Furthermore, according to Koh (2009 pp. 32-37), Soka took various proactive steps 
to present itself as a movement that would aid the state in achieving its objectives from the 
second to fourth phase of religious management mentioned in chapter 2.  
 
Using Beckford’s framework, I would describe Soka as having shifted from a harder to a softer 
mode of revitalization for Singapore and having an adept relationship with its own members. 
Members of Soka generally take up jobs in external society and perform secular social roles. Soka 
Gakkai Singapore would be considered  a ‘State Promoted’ NRM as it managed to enter a very 
symbolic public space, the National Day Parade and owns eight buildings including a 
kindergarten, which is a sizeable number for a small country like Singapore.  Its non-aggressive 
proselytizing which does not threaten social order and its appearance as a rational Buddhist 
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religion  promoting Confucian ethos like filial piety and family values have enabled it to achieve 
this elevated status. The Soka experience in Singapore serves as a good example of an NRM 
which is able to reorientate its form to a more world affirming one to adapt to its environment. At 
the same time, it maintains its aim of revitalization albeit adopting softer strategic approaches to 
carry out this objective. The congruence of Soka’s strategies with the state’s objectives was 
undoubtedly a contributing factor in Soka’s success.  
 
3.3. State Approved: Sathya Sai Baba Organisation  
The Sathya Sai Baba Organisation would be categorized under the ‘state approved’ region. It 
revolves around the worship and teachings of the Hindu godman Sai Baba who claims to be an 
incarnation of Siva (Swallow 1982). Widely acclaimed for his miracles, ecumenism and 
profession of interfaith tolerance (Kent 2004), he heads an estimated 1,200 Sathya Sai Baba 
centres in 130 countries world-wide (www. sathyasai.org). In Singapore, there are 14 centres, 12 
of which operate from Hindu temples (Nicholas 2007, p. 8). There is also a Sai Baba society 
registered in the National University of Singapore (Ramasamy 2007, p. 52). Moreover, in 
exchange for services rendered to local Hindu temples, the group is allowed to hold meetings and 
prayers in temple vicinities.  
 
Nicholas posits that the Sai Baba organisation’s identification with  a ‘state-essentialized form of 
Hinduism’ has allowed it to experience a phenomenal growth of new centres in the period 1993-
2006, in contrast to societies without a substantial Indian and Hindu population, where the 
movement has faced a high degree of anti-cult resistance (Nicholas 2007, pp. 3-8). The 
acceptance, growth and expansion of the movement in Singapore have been attributed to three 
reasons: its doctrine, activities and its ecumenical stance. First, the doctrine, particularly the ‘Ten 
Principles’ and ‘Nine Codes of Conduct’ laid down for Sai Baba devotees are very much aligned 
with the state’s objectives. The ‘Ten Principles’ exhort devotees to be loyal and obedient citizens 
 33
and to bring ‘glory’ to the country (Santhosh 1997, p. 41; Ramasamy 2007, p. 53).  The doctrine 
does not discourage the accumulation of material wealth and promotes hard work while censuring 
laziness. The movement promotes values that contribute to economic development due to its 
advocacy of karma yoga (work done as a form of duty and devotion to God) (Kent 2004, p. 11). 
The emphasis on earning money through hard work upholds the government’s disdain towards a 
welfare-oriented state (Santhosh 1997, p. 41).  Second, the movement’s emphasis on charity and 
social work supports the kind of functionalist role of religion that the state advocates. The various 
Sai Baba centres conduct training classes and provide economic aid to needy families, and also 
organize willing and qualified members to dispense free medical aid, IT services, and financial 
advice (Nicholas 2007). Income inequalities are therefore encouraged to be adjusted without state 
intervention. Third, its ecumenicist and encompassing attitude towards various religions aligns 
the movement with the state’s call for religious tolerance. Sai Baba devotees although 
predominantly from Hindu backgrounds also include Christians, Buddhists and Taoists. The 
movement also allows adherents to maintain their religious affiliation and practices of their parent 
or current religion. In fact, the movement celebrates many of the religious festivities observed in 
Singapore (Santhosh 1997, p. 41).  
 
To Nicholas (2007, p. 20), the state’s position on the movement appears to be ‘characterized by 
benign neglect rather than outright support for the movement, possibly as a result of the 
perception that the movement’s activities would aid the nation-building effort rather than hinder 
it.’  Although the state has allowed the movement to expand, it has not ‘promoted’ it actively 
through the media or other means. This is possibly due to the controversy surrounding the 
personality of Sai Baba. This is a significant implication when comparing NRMs to established 
religions. The presence of a living charismatic leader who is ascribed divine powers by his or her 
followers hinders the movement’s acceptance by the state, even if it promotes values which are 
parallel to the state’s objectives. One reason for that is that the state may be apprehensive of the 
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leader’s influence over his or her followers. Nevertheless, the Sai Baba movement in Singapore 
can be said to relatively successful due to its alignment with Hinduism, ecumenism and the 
promotion of ‘positive’ values which support social order and economic development. The 
movement can be described as orientating between a revitalization and a release mode under 
Beckford’s framework.  Its missionary zeal in spreading its teachings to foster a better world and 
the espousal of Sai Baba as a god-man renders the revitalization label while its flexibility in 
allowing practitioners in maintaining their own faith and rituals with the inclusion of Sai Baba 
comes across as release modus of operandi. As for internal relations, a large and visible 
movement like the Sai Baba is likely to have member relationships ranging from devotee to 
apostate.  
 
3.4. State Monitored: ISKCON 
Although I will present a detailed discussion of the experience of ISKCON in the next section, it 
is useful to introduce it  here as an example of a state-monitored religious movement for 
comparative purposes.  In Singapore most of the members of ISKCON have an adept relationship 
with the movement. The movement itself can be classified as revitalization due to its objective of 
bringing about a spiritual revolution in society. Although many of ISKCON’s early recruits were 
from the hippie communities in New York and San Francisco (Daner 1976) and it was considered 
by scholars to be a ‘world-rejecting’ religion, over the years, it has shifted from a communal 
culture to one that is congregationally based (Rochford 2007, p. 70). The same pattern played out 
in Singapore as most members presently hold regular jobs and simply attend devotional 
programmes during the weekends.  In fact, a large number of devotees are professionals from 
India and labourers from Bangladesh contributing to the Singapore economy. Philosophically, 
they subscribe to the part of ISKCON’s teachings which emphasize that householders (the term 
used to denote married members staying at home as opposed to unmarried ones who stay in a 
temple) should do their work dutifully as an offering to Krishna as per the principles of karma 
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yoga delineated in their scriptures. These characteristics have located them towards the left side 
of the religion management model, denoting positive economic contribution. However, the vivid 
image of the Hare Krishnas as a world rejecting saffron clad ‘cult’ which specifically targets 
youth remains entrenched in the local milieu, resulting in the perception that ISKCON is a threat 
to social order. Thus under the religion management model it would be classified as a ‘state 
monitored’ movement and evidence suggests that this is indeed true.  ISKCON in Singapore is 
not allowed to be officially registered. In fact, it is one of the few countries in the world which 
bars foreign ISKCON monks from entry (Sebastian and Parameswaran, 2008). However, 
Singaporean ISKCON members have been allowed to register societies under different names and 
conduct religious programmes in Hindu temples, thus suggesting that the movement is allowed to 
operate but within the boundaries set up by the state and under its supervision.  
 
ISKCON is a good example of a religious movement which renegotiated its relationship with the 
state and shifted its position in the model. It will be shown later that initially it was ‘repressed’   
because of its association with the American counterculture but gradually, through strategic 
manoeuvring it has moved towards the ‘monitored’ domain.  Its interactions with the state, the 
strategies it has adopted and the shift in its position will be discussed in greater detail to illustrate 
the limited fluidity that religious movements in Singapore enjoy and the rigid  core values of the 
state borne from the desire for economic development and social order.  
 
3.5. State Repressed: Jehovah’s Witnesses 
The Jehovah’s Witnesses in Singapore were de-registered as a society in 1972 because their 
followers refused to undertake the compulsory military service required of male Singaporeans, 
salute the national flag or swear allegiance to the state due to their belief that Satan is responsible 
for organized government and religion (Tong 2007, p. 238). During the 1990s a total of about 
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seventy members were charged in court for various offences such as possession of banned public 
materials, attending unlawful meetings and belonging to an unlawful society (The Straits Times 
12 August 1994, p. 32; 26 February 1995, p. 1; 27 January 1996, p. 47). These episodes received 
wide press coverage. 
Although I have not come across any studies on the movement in Singapore, it is likely that 
internal relationships between members and movement range from devotee to adept. The profiles 
of some of the arrested members indicated that they held regular jobs.  The Jehovah’s Witnesses 
is a revitalization movement due to its obvious objectives of bringing about social change through 
its publications and proselytizing.  However its refusal to compromise its position on military 
service and nationhood border on refuge as it is a symbolic act of disengaging from the expected 
social norms in Singapore. The Jehovah’s Witnesses typify the ‘state Repressed’ category. 
Considered a social and economic threat because of their refusal to accept the concept of 
nationhood and their aggressive evangelizing, they have been the subject of state engineered 
moral panics in the media and legal persecution.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
It can be concluded that NRMs which contribute to economic development and social order by 
promoting values such as respect for other faiths, positive work ethics, respect and obedience to 
social and political structures, are aligned with one of the ‘classified’ mainstream religions and 
consisting of rich cultural capital are more likely to gain acceptance from the State. NRMs which 
are perceived to engage in aggressive proselytization, criticism of other religions, politics and the 
promotion of beliefs which counter the State’s policies and which maintain an ‘alien’ identity are 
likely to be censured. Therefore the state’s claim to neutrality is suspect and the state accords 
preference to particular forms of religion which contribute to economic development and social 







Chapter 4: ISKCON: The Global NRM 
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 4.1. History of ISKCON 
In this chapter, I summarize the ideology and history of ISKCON. This will enable a deeper 
understanding of the worldview and rationalization processes employed by ISKCON members to 
negotiate the situation in Singapore. The ideology of ISKCON is framed by the teachings of its 
founder A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada and is presented herein from a study of some of 
his books (Prabhupada 1977, 1995, 1999) and other books accepted as scripture by ISKCON 
members. The history of the movement has been gleaned from various academic and insider 
publications.  
 
ISKCON belongs to the range of religious movements which have emerged from India Scholars 
have often categorized this genre of religious movements as belonging to either the ‘pre-
independence’ and “post-independence” moments of Indian history (Sinha 2008, p. 144). The 
former were mainly defined by the spirit of reform, to revolutionize Hinduism and ridding it of 
practices such as sati, caste and child marriage. Examples of such movements are Arya Samaj, 
Brahma Samaj and Theosophical Society. The latter emerged as a response to counter-cultural 
and anti-establishment trends especially in industrialized areas and they include the Divine Light 
Mission, Sri Aurobindo Society and Transcendental Meditation (Sinha 2008, p. 144). As far as 
ISKCON is concerned, its parent institution, the Gaudiya Math, would belong to the former 
category due to its reformist attitudes towards caste but ISKCON itself would be aligned with the 
post-independence movements due to its interactions with counter-cultural trends in the West and 
expressions of materialism in industrial societies.  
 
ISKCON is a modern and global branch of the movement inaugurated by the saint and social 
reformer Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, in the sixteenth century in east India. Drawing from 
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monotheistic Vaishnava teachings and the Vedic scriptures, Chaitanya taught that every living 
entity or soul (jiva), due to its desire to exist independently of Krishna or God, is put into the 
material universe and covered by temporary material bodies. The temporary body imprisons and 
subjects the soul to suffering which is categorized into a threefold variety of miseries: 1) miseries 
brought about other living beings 2) miseries due to one’s own body and mind and 3) miseries 
caused by natural forces. The living entity perpetually suffers these miseries according to its own 
karma (chain of actions and reactions) and undergoes the cycle of repeated birth, death, old age 
and disease.  However the actual identity of the living entity is nonmaterial and is spiritual in 
nature like its origin, Krishna. But quantitatively, the soul is infinitesimal and Krishna is infinite. 
The eternal position or dharma of the soul is to be established in a loving devotional relationship 
of service with Krishna in the spiritual world. This renders the soul the highest bliss and most 
complete knowledge. The human form of life is specifically meant to become ‘Krishna 
conscious’ and revive this relationship through the practise of bhakti yoga (devotional service) 
under the guidance of a spiritual master or guru.   
 
The principles of bhakti yoga taught in ISKCON as in other traditional Vaishnava schools are to 
always engage one’s senses in devotional service, by chanting, hearing and remembering 
Krishna’s names and pastimes. ISKCON’s practices of singing Krishna’s names in public and 
distributing literature describing the stories of Krishna and the philosophy are based on this 
principle. Perfection in Krishna consciousness is attained when such service is uninterrupted, 
unmotivated and favourable to Krishna, therein achieving the status of ‘pure devotional service’.  
At that stage, the devotee by the blessings of his spiritual master and Krishna achieves the goal of 
life, which is love for Krishna or krishna prema. The devotee thus becomes eligible to enter into 
the spiritual world and serve Krishna in his or her spiritual body. ISKCON’s teachings warn that 
if the human being fails to at least attempt the path of bhakti yoga, he or she may  fall down into 
the lower species of life such as animals, plants or aquatics depending on his or her karma. The 
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soul then has to transmigrate through various species of life before being given the chance to 
attain a human birth again. It should also be mentioned that ISKCON members conceptualize 
Krishna as omnipotent and omninescient. An often quoted phrase of Prabhupada by ISKCON 
devotees is that ‘not even a blade of grass moves without the sanction of the Supreme Lord.’  It 
will be shown later that this belief has wide implications in how ISKCON members rationalize 
their strategies and internally adjust their worldview when faced with obstacles to their practices 
in Singapore. 
 
One belief of ISKCON members distinct from traditional Vaishnava sects is the tenet that 
Chaitanya is an incarnation of Krishna. According to this belief, Krishna had incarnated 500 years 
ago to practically demonstrate how to apply the principles of bhakti yoga that he had taught in the 
Bhagavad Gita. Chaitanya specifically espoused the chanting of the Hare Krishna mantra: Hare 
Krishna Hare Krishna, Krishna Krishna Hare Hare, Hare Rama Hare Rama, Rama Rama, Hare 
Hare, as the most potent method to ‘cleanse the heart’ and revive one’s eternal relationship with 
Krishna in the present age of Kali yuga (the most irreligious age according to Hindu beliefs) 
(Prabhupada 1999, Beck 2004, p. 35-36). However, he also added that any authorized name of 
God could be chanted for spiritual benefit. Thus it is not uncommon for ISKCON members, 
following the example of Prabhupada, to be encouraging members of other faiths like Christians 
or Muslims to chant the names of Jehovah, Christ or Allah. Chaitanya encouraged all his 
followers, known as Gaudiya Vaishnavas, to propagate the teachings of devotion to Krishna and 
he himself travelled throughout India chanting and persuading others to chant (Prabhupada 1999). 
Chaitanya was also known to have predicted that his name would be sung in every town and 
village, and, since then, Gaudiya Vaishnava teachers have stressed the importance of propagating 
the names of Krishna and Chaitanya (Knott 2000, p. 154).  
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Historically, the movement has met with opposition from various sections of society such as the 
caste brahmins, Muslim rulers, tantric yogis and monists. The first recorded instance of resistance 
from the state took place during the time of Chaitanya himself when India was ruled by the 
Moghuls. According to the biographies of Caitanya, the then chief magistrate of Bengal, Chand 
Khazi had banned the congregational chanting of Krishna’s names (called sankirtan) (Prabhupada 
1987, p. 10). He ordered his soldiers to enter the homes of devotees where they were taking place, 
confiscate and even break the musical instruments that were used. He also threatened the 
devotees with arrest and forced conversion to Islam. Local Hindus who were opposed to 
Chaitanya’s movement supported this ban claiming that God’s name should be chanted in the 
mind and that Chaitanya and his followers were transgressing scriptural injunctions.  The 
devotees stopped the kirtans out of fear and informed Chaitanya of their plans to migrate 
elsewhere. In response, Chaitanya angrily ordered all the Vaishnavas to assemble on the streets of 
Navadvip (the then capital of Bengal) and organized a massive civil disobedience movement by 
personally leading the first public sankirtan party with thousands of his followers who had 
assembled with torches.  The sankirtan party proceeded towards Chand Kazi’s residence and had 
by then increased in numbers exponentially.  Eventually Chaitanya personally met with the 
terrified Khazi and engaged in theological discussions with him and requested him to lift the ban 
on the sankirtan movement, which the Kazi acceded to. Five hundred years later, under 
Prabhupada’s leadership, members of the movement were routinely jailed in places like Australia 
for engaging in public sankirtan before being eventually allowed to do so legally (Kurma Das 
1999, p. 191-223 ).  Incidents like these are of significance to ISKCON members as they would 
draw on the resource pools of these historic-scriptural incidents as reference points to frame their 
own responses to oppression.  
 
Chaitanya’s movement witnessed a gradual decline from the sixteenth century until it was revived 
in the nineteenth century by an English-educated Bengali jurist, known as Kedarnatha Dutta or 
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Bhaktivinode Thakur. Bhaktivinode produced nearly 100 books including English ones, 
established a printing press, re-discovered the birthplace of Chaitanya and other places of 
significance for Gaudiya Vaishnavas (Hopkins 1989; Shukavak Das 1996-1997 cited in Knott 
2000, p. 154). He also identified and censured what he deemed to be various deviant sects which 
stemmed from Chaitanya’s lineage. At present he is credited by devotees with having restored 
Gaudiya Vaishnavism to its full authenticity. It is interesting to note that Bhaktivinode Thakur 
who had worked a magistrate under the colonial rule of the British, expressed preference for the 
British administration to Moghul rule in his rendition of Aryan history: 
The Mohammedans ruled over India from 1206 A.D. to 1757 A.D., when they 
were driven away by the Englishmen. During the Mohammedan rule India fell 
into inauspiciousness. Temples were destroyed, the Aryan blood was polluted in 
various ways, the standard of varnasrama-dharma was diminished, and the 
discussion of ancient Aryan history was almost stopped. 
At present, under the rule of the English, the Aryans are living more peacefully 
and prosperously. Vedic history and the glories of the Aryans are again being 
discussed. There is no longer fear of temples being destroyed. In brief, we have 
been delivered from a great calamity. 
(Bhaktivinode Thakur 1998, p. 32) 
 
 Significantly, he also predicted that a great saint would soon come to spread the chanting of 
Krishna’s names all over the world and that ‘fair skinned foreigners will come to Mayapur (the 
birthplace of Chaitanya)’ and join Bengali Vaishnavas in the congregational chanting of 
Krishna’s and Chaitanya’s names (www.indiadivine.org). His son, Bhaktisiddhanta Saraswati 
Thakur carried on his work by accepting the renounced order of life (sannyasa) and 
institutionalizing Gaudiya Vaishnavism by establishing more than 64 temples in India (known as 
Gaudiya Maths), printing books and initiating thousands of disciples, one of whom was A. C 
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Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada (Rupa Vilas Das 1988). Prabhupada, from his first meetings 
with Saraswati Thakur was directed to preach Chaitanya’s message in English to the Western 
world and to print devotional literature in English (Satsvarupa Das Goswami 1983). 
 
Following his spiritual master’s order, Prabhupada arrived in the US in 1965, at the age of 
seventy with just forty rupees and a trunk full of his books. He preached vigorously at every 
opportunity and soon found ‘ready listeners among the young and disaffected’ (Knott 2000, p. 
154; Daner 1976, p. 6).  In his early years in America, he gave storefront lectures in modest 
rented units in Second Avenue, New York and Haight-Ashbury, San Francisco where the 
American counterculture or the hippie movement thrived. He established the International Society 
of Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in New York in 1966. Soon Prabhupada wrote more books, 
started the first public kirtans outside of India (congregational singing of the names of Krishna) 
and ratha yatras (chariot processions of Krishna) and sent out missionaries to open centres 
worldwide and to distribute his books (Satsvarupa Das Goswami 1980). He published more than 
sixty volumes, including the Bhagavad Gita As It Is, Srimad Bhagavatam, Caitanya Caritamrta 
and the monthly Back to Godhead magazine (Knott 2000, p.154; Rochford 2007, p. 13). Soon the 
movement spread to European, African and Asian countries and Prabhupada had established over 
100 temples in 11 years before passing away in 1977. Thus Prabhupada is widely regarded by 
Gaudiya Vaishnavas to have fulfilled the prediction of Chaitanya and Bhaktivinode Thakur and is 
held in high esteem as a messenger of Krishna. 
 
In the mid 1970s, ISKCON has been described by scholars as being in a state of high tension with 
its environment (Rochford 1987, p. 114). Like many other new religious groups, ISKCON 
mapped its own oppositional religious culture through its internal structure, robust practices and 
symbols which integrated members and segregated them from the perceived corrosive effects of 
the external secular world (Rochford 2007, p. 6). According to Lofland (1987) and Stark (1996), 
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communitarian NRMs tend to foster strict religious cultures that place considerable demands on 
their members. ISKCON functioned on a rigorous structure of communalism and to join ISKCON 
was equated to living in the temple. In all ISKCON temples, a standard program is observed. 
Members living in the temple are required to rise early and attend the early morning worship 
which begins at 4.30am. They are also required to abstain from eating meat (including eggs), 
illicit sex, ingesting intoxicants (cigarettes, alcohol, tea, coffee and drugs), and gambling. At the 
point of initiation, where devotees formally accept a guru and receive a Sanskrit name, they vow 
to follow these principles and to chant at least sixteen rounds of the Hare Krishna mantra daily on 
a string of 108 prayer beads (Squarcini and Fizzoti 2004, p. 43-44).  At the end of the morning 
worship, a class is held on Prabhupada’s commentaries on the Vedic scriptures. This ritualistic 
routine is meant to maintain individual and collective purity by concentrating the mind on 
Krishna (Rochford 2007, p. 12). ISKCON in the 1960s and 1970s attracted the hippies in 
America by appealing to their sense of seeking a transcendent form of bliss: ‘Below the large 
“Hare Krishna’ sign on the outside of the temple was a small placard that stated: “Stay High All 
the Time, Discover Eternal Bliss” ‘ (Johnson 1976, p. 38 cited in Rochford 2007, p. 12). 
Therefore ISKCON’s communal structure emerged to house several counterculture youths who 
recently moved to the area and did not have a stable residence (Rochford 2007, p. 12). It should 
be noted that during the counterculture era, besides ISKCON, a number of eastern new religious 
movements such as Meher Baba appealed to drug users by offering mystical experiences to 
substitute and terminate drug taking and subsequently reintegrating them to society (Robbins 
1969).  
 
During this period, ISKCON supported itself economically by the public distribution of its 
literature. Devotees also distributed incense or Back to Godhead magazines to the public in 
exchange for donations in prominent places like airports (Rochford 1985, p. 173).  Thus 
ISKCON, under the guidance of Prabhupada, embarked on a strategy of combining the 
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movement’s missionary goals with its economic sustenance. Another feature of the movement in 
this period was that there was a widespread culture of encouraging a celibate, renunciate life and 
renunciate leaders or sannyasis generally opposed marriage and family life (Rochford 2007, p. 7). 
Children of devotees were enlisted in ashram-based gurukula (boarding schools) where they lived 
separate lives from their parents. This was meant to enculturate the next generation. It also 
effectively freed up parents’ time to engage in missionary and devotional activities. During this 
time, the anti-cult movement was also at its peak in America, and ISKCON like the members of 
the Unification Church became a target of public scrutiny because of its fund raising practices in 
airports and other public places and its recruitment of young people who thereafter became 
world-rejecting devotees (Rochford 1987, p.110). ISKCON’s communities consequently became 
increasingly closed religious enclaves and interaction with outsiders was limited largely to 
proselytizing and distributing literature (Rochford 1985, p. 159-60). The public image of 
ISKCON was reshaped from a ‘peculiar, but essentially harmless, religious movement to a 
threatening and dangerous one’ largely due to the anticult propaganda disseminated by the media 
(Rochford 2007, p. 13).  ISKCON, at this juncture of its development would conform to the 
typologies of devotee for the internal relationship between members and refuge for the external 
relationship between movement and society according to Beckford’s model. Members of the 
movement were economically, socially and spiritually dependent on the movement’s authorities. 
The locations or posts in which they served were determined by local temple presidents, 
ISKCON’s official ecclesiastical authority the GBC (Governing Body Commission) or by 
Prabhupada himself.  
 
4.2. Contemporary trends 
In the years immediately following Prabhupada’s death, succession struggles, economic decline 
and negative publicity reshaped ISKCON’s social organization and religious culture.  The most 
significant feature of the early post-Prabhupada years was the crisis of authority which ISKCON 
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experienced and which to an extent has continued to the present. Eleven of Prabhupada’s senior 
disciples declared themselves to have been appointed as successor gurus to Prabhupada 
(Rochford 1985, p. 221 – 222).  Implementing a structure of religious authority known as the 
zonal acharya system, they divided the world into different zones and established themselves as 
the only initiating guru for their designated geographical area, exercising complete political, 
economic and spiritual authority (Rochford 1998, p. 103 -106). Controversy arose over their 
legitimacy as there was no clear evidence that Prabhupada appointed them as successors and 
many of them were unable to maintain their spiritual vows and were involved in high profile 
scandals. This system lasted for ten years and resulted in a significant exodus of ISKCON 
members who felt that they were subjected to abuse of power or who were expelled for not 
submitting to the authorities (Rochford 1998, p. 106, 111). By 1987, an internal reform 
movement succeeded in transforming the guru system by disallowing the zonal acharyas from  
retaining any exclusive control over a particular geographical territory and by the inclusion of 
more gurus, reaching a number of more than eighty in 1995 (Gelberg 1988, p. 181).  On parallel 
lines, there was another dissident group that emerged in the late 1990s known as the ritviks who 
contend that none of ISKCON’s gurus were authorized by Prabhupada and were consequently 
unqualified to serve in their positions. They claim that ISKCON had been hijacked as part of a 
‘great guru hoax’, that Prabhupada had never appointed any of his disciples to act as initiating 
gurus but only as ritviks (ceremonial priests) initiating disciples on behalf of Prabhupada and that 
he had to be restored as the sole initiating guru for ISKCON throughout the term of the 
movement’s existence (Rochford 2007, p. 171- 175). The ritvik challenge provoked vigorous 
opposition from ISKCON leaders and the confrontation has resulted in a series of lawsuits 
between the two groups (Rochford 2007, p. 174). ISKCON’s succession and continuity 
experience is similar to Weber’s characterization of succession as the ‘routinization of charisma’ 
which can foment discontent through theological disputes, alienation of some from the 
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impersonal ecclesiastical bureaucracy, and nostalgia for the supposedly recoverable ‘purer’ 
message of the first generation cult (Shupe 2003, p. 628).  
 
Another phenomenon related to the guru issue in ISKCON is the defection of a number of 
devotees to Vaishnava organizations headed by Prabhupada’s godbrothers in India (the Gaudiya 
Math) (Rochford 2007, p. 169- 171). The most prominent of them have been B.R. Sridhara 
Maharaja, Prabhupada’s intimate godbrother and Narayana Maharaja, a disciple of Prabhupada’s 
godbrother, and associate of Prabhupada who had performed his last rites. Most of the devotees 
joining them are disciples of Prabhupada who had become frustrated with ISKCON leadership 
and who sought out more esoteric forms of teachings in Gaudiya Vaishnava theology. Disciples 
of Prabhupada’s successors who had fallen from their position as gurus also sought re-initiation 
from Gaudiya Math gurus. ISKCON leadership saw the Gaudiya Math gurus as a threat to 
Prabhupada’s position as the supreme source of ideology and formidable competitors for 
ISKCON’s assets and followers and reacted by passing resolutions banning ISKCON members 
from associating with them or their teachings (Collins 2004, p. 222-224). The resolution also 
provided for the possible suspension of ISKCON members who failed to comply. Nevertheless 
hundreds of ISKCON devotees disregarded this and joined or set up Gaudiya Math missions 
worldwide. Consequently from the 1990s, Gaudiya Missions have extended out of India and 
proliferated to various parts of the world, existing side by side with ISKCON temples, though 
usually functioning on a smaller scale.  
 
A serious issue which threatened ISKCON in the 1980s and which seems to have had dramatic 
and permanent effects was an economic crisis as revenues from its literature distribution plunged 
in the American and European continents.  Consequently, ISKCON’s communal structure  in 
these places became unsustainable and disintegrated. Thereafter ISKCON became a 
congregationally based movement composed mainly of independent nuclear families (Rochford 
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2007, p. 7). The proportion of householders in ISKCON had far outnumbered unmarried 
renunciates. From the 1990s, the majority of devotees had regular jobs outside of the movement 
and mostly visited the temples on weekends and festival days. They were no longer encouraged to 
join “full-time” (Rochford 2007, p. 52- 73). This was not inconsistent with their philosophy 
which permitted followers to engage in secular occupations as long as they dovetailed their 
occupations with their service by spending a portion of their income for religious activities and by 
setting aside time for their devotional practices. Furthermore, the gurukul system broke down, 
primarily due to a lack of funding and the majority of ISKCON’s young people have had to be 
educated outside the movement for the past two decades (Rochford 2007, p. 98).  
 
Another major phenomenon that altered the mosaic of ISKCON members is the large influx of 
Hindu Indian migrants in ISKCON temples worldwide from the 1980s, especially in the US and 
UK. They were instrumental in assuring ISKCON’s survival through their donations and 
supported the movement during attacks from the anti-cult movement and government officials 
(Rochford 2007, p. 181 – 184). Beckford’s model would refer to them as patrons. Estimates 
indicate that in 2005, a considerable majority of ISKCON’s approximately 50 000 member North 
American congregation was of Indian descent (Rochford 2007, p. 182). This was a significant 
breakaway from ISKCON’s early demographics. In the initial years, Prabhupada had questioned 
the spiritual commitment of Indians who immigrated to the West, believing that their primary 
motive for coming to America was ‘to earn money’ and that the ‘best thing will be to avoid them 
as far as possible’ (Prabhupada 1992, p. 1570 cited in Rochford 2007, p. 182).  Only after 
ISKCON had been well established in North America did Prabhupada encourage Indians and 
other Hindus to become involved in the movement (Rochford 2007, p. 183).  Moreover, 
Prabhupada wanted to maintain a non-sectarian identity for ISKCON.  He disassociates Hinduism 
from the beliefs of ISKCON by declaring the Hare Krishna movement to be a revival of the 
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principle of sanatana-dharma.  In the introduction to his commentary on the Bhagavad Gita, he 
says, 
Sanatana-dharma does not refer to any sectarian process of religion. It is the 
eternal function of the eternal living entities in relationship with the eternal 
Supreme Lord…it refers to the eternal occupation of the living entity….The 
English word religion is a little different from sanatana-dharma. Religion 
conveys the idea of faith, and faith may change. One may have faith in a 
particular process, and he may change this faith and adopt another, but sanatana- 
dharma refers to that activity which cannot be changed…Those belonging to 
some sectarian faith will wrongly consider that sanatana-dharma is also 
sectarian, but if we go deeply into the matter and consider it in the light of 
modern science, it is possible for us to see that sanatana-dharma is the business 
of the people of the world – nay, of all the living entities in the universe.   
(Prabhupada 1995, p. 18). 
 
Similarly in a conversation with his followers in America, Prabhupada emphasized that ISKCON 
was not a Hindu movement: 
I don’t want a Hindu temple. Our constitution is different. We want everyone. 
Krishna consciousness is for everyone. It is not a Hindu propaganda. People may 
not understand. And actually, till now in our [ISKCON] society there is not a 
single other Hindu than me (laughter). Is that not?  
(June 9, 1969 quoted in Rochford 2007, p. 182)  
 
However in later years, as a response to negative publicity, ISKCON adopted strategies aimed at 
fostering a more positive public image by aligning their social position more closely with the 
dominant culture and its religious institutions (Rochford, 1984, p. 110). The main purpose of 
these efforts was to convince the public that ISKCON was a legitimate religious movement and 
not a deviant and threatening group. One example of such efforts was in 1980, where the North 
American GBC declared its intention to alter ISKCON’s public image from that of a ‘cult’ to ‘a 
denomination of the Hindu Church’ in the US (Rochford 1985, p. 271). For the Indians, ISKCON 
temples and restaurants where authentic Indian meals were served were an avenue of cultural and 
religious affirmation in a new environment (Rochford 2007, p 183). This was especially so when 
Indian immigration increased in the US and Canada from the 1960s and there were hardly any 
Hindu temples to serve their needs (Rochford 2007, p. 183).  One result of this phenomenon, 
termed  the ‘Hinduization of ISKCON’ has been that Western devotees perceive a dilution of 
ISKCON’s original practices as Indian Hindus inadvertently introduce their social and religious 
beliefs in temples (such as the worship of other Hindu gods who are considered to be demigods or 
agents of Krishna and social rituals such as marriage ceremonies and holi festivals) (Rochford 
2007,  p. 188 – 200).  
 
 The ‘Hinduization of ISKCON’ has not been a one-way process. As the numbers in the Indian 
diaspora increased exponentially over the last two decades and Hindutva sentiments emerged 
with a new zeal in India and abroad, Hindu communities were eager to encompass ISKCON 
temples within their fold. This could be due to the widespread location of over 400 ISKCON 
temples and hundreds of Gaudiya Math temples in various parts of the world. That ISKCON has 
been accepted as a Hindu organization by many Hindus is demonstrated during times of 
oppression, when a new Hindu unity is imagined and enacted.  One such incident was in 2005, 
when the mayor of Moscow had cancelled an order by the Government to allocate land to 
ISKCON for the construction of a temple (Humphries, 2006, p. 1).  ISKCON members sent out 
appeals for support on their website entitled ‘this an urgent request for help and support in a 
situation where Hindu dharma in Moscow is now at stake’ (www.moscowtemple.org). Several 
Hindu leaders responded by expressing their support for the Hare Krishna community in Russia 
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and condemned the acts of the mayor.  This incident also drew a political response at the highest 
level from India, as Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh discussed it with Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin during the former’s visit to Moscow that year.  Several newspaper 
reports referred to the proposed temple as a ‘Hindu temple’ and to the Hare Krishna devotees as 
‘Hindus’ (http://www.wwrn.org, http://www.hfb.org.uk). In 2006, when the Kazakhstan 
government demolished eleven homes belonging to Hare Krishna devotees, several national 
Hindu organizations such as the Hindu American Foundation and Hindu Forum of Britain 
expressed their disapproval and perceived the act to be persecution of Hindus 
(http://www.hafsite.org/media/pr/iskcon-kazakhstan, http://www.hinduforum.org/).  Apart from 
times of persecution, the status of ISKCON has risen in India, so much so that the Indian state 
often expresses its appreciation for ISKCON’s achievements abroad. For example In 1996, the 
Government of India issued a commemorative stamp depicting the image of Prabhupada. In 1998, 
while speaking at an inauguration ceremony of an ISKCON temple, then prime minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee said: 
If the Bhagavad Gita, the holy text of the Hindu traditions, is printed in millions 
of copies and scores of languages and distributed in all nooks and corners of the 
world, the credit for this great sacred service goes chiefly to ISKCON. For this 
accomplishment alone, Indians should be eternally grateful to the devoted 
spiritual army of Swami Prabhupada, the founder of the Hare Krishna movement, 
and to his followers. . . The arrival of Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada in the 
United States in 1965 and the particular popularity his movement gained in a 
very short span of twelve years must be regarded as one of the greatest spiritual 
events of the century.  (http://www.vnn.org/world/9804/07-1732/index.html) 
 
Besides the above mentioned trends, there have been other significant issues which impacted on 
the religious and social domains of ISKCON such as the activism by pro-change women fighting 
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for equal rights in the wake of a history of mistreatment and marginalisation (Rochford 2007, p. 
115 – 160), and the much publicized child abuse in ISKCON boarding schools and consequent 
lawsuits claimed by former gurukul children seeking justice (Rochford 2007, p. 74 - 96).  
However these issues bear little relation to the experiences of Singapore ISKCON members and 
hence will not be discussed here. Also, I am aware that there are some research work on ISKCON 
in Asia such as Howe (2001) and Brooks (1992), however, they have little bearing on the 
discussion of the movement’s interaction with the state in Singapore. However, it is clear that 
contemporary ISKCON when viewed through the lenses of Beckford’s model would be rendered 
an adept tag to describe the majority of relationships between members and movement and a 
revitalization tag to describe the movement’s relationship with society. In the next chapter it will 
be seen that the trends and phenomena in global ISKCON had a direct and deep impact on the 













Chapter 5: ISKCON in Singapore 
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5.1. Methodology 
In this section I will discuss the history of ISKCON in Singapore from its inception in 1971 to its 
current status, the state’s management of the movement and the strategies adopted by members to 
gain recognition as a bona fide religion. It will be shown later in this chapter that there are a 
number of congregations in Singapore which identify themselves with ISKCON and that 
opinions, practice and ideology vary amongst these congregations and even amongst individuals.  
However for the purpose of discussion, I categorize all devotees who accept Prabhupada as their 
spiritual authority as ISKCON members. First, I will briefly describe the methods of fieldwork 
that were undertaken to collect primary data.  
 
I spent about five years interacting with devotees and attending various programmes in 
Singapore, Malaysia, India and Australia, largely driven by my personal interest in Vedic 
theology and my research on the identity of Brahmins in Singapore (Parameswaran and Sebastian 
2007), Chinese families’ reactions to conversion of kin to Hare Krishna (Sebastian and 
Parameswaran 2007), and the interplay between the State, Hinduism and Hare Krishna devotees 
in Singapore (Sebastian and Parameswaran 2008). Although the last paper is of relevance to the 
topic at hand, the major portion of fieldwork for the thesis was carried out from 2008 to 2009. 
The research was mainly conducted in Singapore, with the occasional visit to Malaysia to 
interview devotees who played a key role in the development of the Hare Krishna movement in 
the city-state.  The data were collected through participant observation and interviews with 
informants. I attended programs in temples and private homes and major festivals organised by 
different congregations of devotees. I also gathered insights into the respondents’ lives and 
perceptions through weekly interactions, friendships, informal conversations, and socialising as 
well as from recorded interviews.  I attended public proselytising activities such as devotional 
programs in community centres. Over the years due to my personal interest in the philosophy, I 
had adopted some aspects of the practices of Vaishnavism into my personal life, such as reading 
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Prabhupada’s books and participating in kirtans.  This  enabled me to understand an insider’s 
perspective while being careful to retain a level of objectivity as a prerequisite for social science 
research.  During the course of my research I was also careful to get acquainted with the various 
ISKCON clusters and divided my time in attending the various programs organised by them. 
However at one instance I experienced hostility from a respondent from the Krishna Mandir who 
was upset that I denoted the Krishna Mandir as just another group, instead of as the main  
representatives of the Hare Krishna movement in Singapore in  a previous paper I had published 
(Sebastian and Parameswaran 2008) and who had refused subsequent interviews. The advantages 
of participant observation, developing friendships with devotees and displaying a genuine 
personal interest in Vaishnava philosophy were manifold; I would not have been able to gain the 
trust of the devotees and deeper insights into their perspectives had I not done so. Interviews 
alone tended to produce an idealised portrayal of state-ISKCON relations.  It was after participant 
observation in the programs and through close friendships that I understood more about the actual 
scenarios and struggles. There were also incidents and issues that the devotees themselves did not 
find important but which were vital to my understanding of state-ISKCON relations. Most 
devotees appreciated that I was conducting research on them and documenting the history of the 
movement in Singapore. I also showed respondents my previous publications on the movement to 
impress upon them that I was serious about the research and not wasting their time. Moreover 
since they more or less knew me personally, they were at ease to speak freely and did not harbour 
suspicions that I was a government agent trying to glean information from them or that I would 
misrepresent them.  Despite this, I am conscious that since my respondents know that the research 
will be published, they may have avoided discussing negative views of the state and delivered 
what they perceive to be desired answers.  
 
Interviews were conducted in order to explore the devotees’ backgrounds, to understand how they 
perceived the state and state approved religious authorities like the Hindu Endowments Board in 
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relation to the movement.  I interviewed thirty devotees, ranging from the age of twenty one to 
sixty, targeting those who played key roles, who were leaders and who were from various groups. 
I also included those who did not identify themselves with any particular congregation but kept to 
themselves so as to understand the reasons for their behaviour. Interviews were typically 
conducted in respondents’ homes or in temples or restaurants. Because of the sensitive nature of 
the topic involved and due to ethical considerations, I will not reveal the real names of my 
respondents. Instead, they will be referred to as respondent A, B, C and so on. The suffix ‘Das’ 
would be used for male initiated members and ‘Dasi’ for female initiated members as that is how 
they are addressed in devotee circles. Where real names are revealed, these refer to public or 
historical personalities whose actions and words are available in the public domain.  
 
I had also written to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which oversees the management of religion in 
Singapore to request for an interview. I was hoping to get the official viewpoint on religious 
movements and to verify the claims made by ISKCON members. However my request was 
declined and I was provided with the following message:  
 
Singapore is a secular state. The Government maintains a neutral position on 
religious matters and acts only to maintain social harmony and cohesion. Under 
the Constitution, our citizens are guaranteed the right to practice any religion of 
their choice. Similarly, religious groups can manage their own religious affairs. 
These rights are not absolute. Just as our laws accord equal protection to every 
person, they apply equally to every person. No one is allowed to break our laws 
with impunity or act in a fashion that undermines national interest on account of  
his religious beliefs.  
 
An important feature of our laws and policies is the special regard we give to 
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racial and religious harmony. This reflects the importance of peaceful co-
existence and understanding between the different groups in Singapore. Any 
attempt to wound the religious feelings of a person, undermine the relationships 
between different groups or to use religion as a guise to pursue a political 
objective are met with punishments under laws such as the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act and the Penal Code. The Government also seeks to 
facilitate greater inter-religious dialogue and understanding through structures 
such as Inter-Racial Confidence Circles and Community Engagement 
Programme. 
. 
This response reflects the official viewpoint that was discussed in the previous sections. The 
execution of the above mentioned policy would be examined with regard to the state’s interaction 
with the Hare Krishna movement. In the following section a chronological account of ISKCON’s 
development in Singapore will be given as it relates to state intervention.  
 
5.2. Taking Root (1970s) 
Expansion of ISKCON in Singapore was already envisaged as early as 1970. Prabhupada wrote 
to his disciple, Bali Mardan that preaching in Singapore would be good for two reasons. The first 
was that like Hong Kong, Singapore was an English speaking country, so it would not be difficult 
for his Western disciples to communicate.  Second, there were many Indians there who would 
support the movement (Janananda Das 1996, p. 6-7). Thus Bali Mardan who was later joined by 
Amogha Das, soon arrived in Singapore in January 1971 and initially stayed in the Srinivas 
Perumal temple (Bali Mardan Das 1996, p. 32). A Chinese lady who was sympathetic to the 
movement had given them residence and the use of her house in Stevens Road for programs.  
During this period, they would go door to door selling books during the day, and in the evenings, 
hold programs in houses and temples. The Indians, especially the Sindhis were receptive to the 
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devotees.  Bali Mardan and Amogha also preached to students in the University of Singapore, as 
it was known then.  A local newspaper, the New Nation covered the occasion:  
 
Wearing orange robes and beads and with pigtails trailing from the back of 
shaven heads, two strangers raised some eyebrows at the University of Singapore 
campus yesterday. They were members of the Hare Krishna movement who 
came to the university to recruit followers to their religious order. Ringing bells, 
they sat down in the students’ union canteen and in a short time a crowd of 
undergraduates gathered around them. After a talk, the two strangers were seen to 
walk back to their recently established headquarters in Stevens Road. 
 (Janananda Das 1996, p.14) 
 
There was also a favourable report in a local Tamil newspaper, the Tamil Malar. The article 
described how the Europrean "Hindu" swamis dressed in the traditional way, attracted much 
attention in Singapore with their orange robes, neck beads and shaven heads (Janananda Das 
1996, p. 13). It read: 
 
Although from America, they are not hippies. The Swamis belong to the Hare 
Krishna movement, ISKCON started in America. In their temporary residence at 
80, Stevens Road, they conduct bhajans and classes on Bhagavad-gita at 7am 
daily. Also on Sundays at 4 pm, and Mondays and Wednesdays at 7pm. 
Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, who originally started the movement is from 
India. ISKCON, started in 1966, now has 52 centres worldwide. The Hare 
Krishnas are expecting to establish their own place in Singapore in the future. 
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Although the devotees had the use of a large house, they were not free to go out and perform the 
singing of the Hare Krishna mantra in public places as they did in other parts of the world. 
Another problem cited was that they only had short term visas (Janananda Das 1996, p. 11) 
 
The first local devotee who joined was a young Chinese man named, Neo Chee Wee (Janananda 
Das 1996, p. 13).  Neo, a Malaysian citizen, living in Singapore,  had first met Bali Mardan on a  
bus and had  been attending the Sunday ‘love feasts’ which were free vegetarian feasts prepared 
by the devotees.  Soon, Neo would leave his job and adopt saffron robes and begin preaching in 
Malaysia. When Prabhupada heard about the developments in Singapore, he sent two more of his 
disciples there. They were Gopal Das, a young American and Hanuman Das, a French Canadian.  
Together, these devotees led a kirtan procession during the Hindu thaipusam festival of 1971 
(Janananda Das 1996, p. 15; Bali Mardan Das 1996, p. 44). The current temple president of the 
Krishna Mandir was one of those present during this kirtan (Bali Mardan Das 1996, p. 44). 
Prabhupada encouraged his disciples and requested them to proselytize to the Chinese: 
 
If we can get some Chinese followers of this cult, it will be a great success. I 
know that amongst the Chinese there are so many scholars and learned, cultured 
gentlemen. So to convince them will be easier than others, even though they are 
of the Buddhist philosophy. That is akin to our philosophy, although it is a little 
different. 
(Letter to Bali Mardan 2 June 1971) 
 
In March 1971, Prabhupada was to come for a short stay on his way to Australia from India. 
There was a program arranged at the Srinivas Perumal temple where a crowd of a thousand 
people had gathered. However, Prabhupada and his entourage were barred from going beyond the 
customs checkpoint at the airport.  According to several biographies and accounts from devotees, 
 60
this was the only such incident in the world. ISKCON’s official biography of Prabhupada 
describes this visit as follows:  
  
Prabhupada travelled with three disciples: Syamasundara as his secretary, 
Pradyumna as his servant and Sanskrit editor, and Nandakumara as his cook. The 
first stop was Singapore, where, without explanation, immigration authorities 
refused Prabhupada entry into the country. Sympathetic Indians in Singapore had 
arranged for Prabhupada to lecture and had even mailed hundreds of invitations, 
but Srila Prabhupada, disappointed and feeling ill, had to continue the twelve-
hour flight to Sydney. 
(Satsvarupa Das Goswami 1983, p.89) 
 
Similarly, in another biography written by one of Prabhupada’s secretaries, a transit in Singapore 
in April 1976 was described as follows:  
The plane touched down in Singapore at 5.00p.m. for a four-hour transit stop. 
Because Prabhupada and I were in first class, he decided to use the first-class 
lounge to rest in. However, it was located inside the airport, and to get to it we 
had to pass through immigration. 
As soon as the officials saw our shaved heads and robes they refused us entry. I 
felt angry to see these mundane men obstruct the entry of a pure devotee, yet sad 
that they were guaranteed their stay in the material world by their offense. 
Prabhupada is undergoing so much trouble, with no personal motive whatever, 
simply to do good for others, yet they were such rascals that they wanted to 
obstruct him. 
Pusta Krishna Swami argued with them for nearly fifteen minutes before they 
agreed to let us through. 
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(Hari Sauri Das 1992, p. 565) 
 
It is unclear as to the exact reasons for Prabhupada not being allowed entry into Singapore but the 
city-state has gained notoriety in ISKCON’s historical discourse of being the only country to have 
barred their founder. The biographies of Prabhupada written by his close disciples will ensure that 
these episodes will be entrenched in the minds of future generations of ISKCON devotees, both 
international and local. Currently explanations such as ‘the Government suspected him of being a 
CIA agent,’ and ‘the devotees with Prabhupada didn’t know how to talk’ are common amongst 
devotee circles. However it is likely that the Singapore government had perceived ISKCON to be 
a product of the much abhorred American counter-culture phenomenon. This thesis is supported 
by the fact that Amogha and Hanuman were restricted from entering Singapore in February 1971 
when they tried to re-enter after a preaching engagement in Malaysia. Janananda Das in his book, 
‘Prabhupada in Malaysia’ relates the account as follows: 
  
That day Hanuman and Amogha journeyed to Singapore, only to be stopped at 
the Singaporean border by immigration officers waving a copy of the article at 
them, "Are you Amogha?" they asked, "Are you Hanuman?" The names in the 
newspaper picture were the wrong way round so the devotees said: "No!" They 
were refused entry and had to return to Kuala Lumpur (Das 1996, p. 20). 
 
 The newspaper article referred to above was published in a Malaysian newspaper and was about 
the devotees’ visit there.  Despite the restrictions on ISKCON devotees, one of my respondents 
revealed that another of Prabhupada’s disciples, Bhurijana Das had come to Singapore and 
conducted some programs at the Perumal temple in 1974.  
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In 1973, Prabhupada had initiated a Chinese student (who will be referred to as A Das) in 
Melbourne and whose family was living in Singapore.   Later, a couple of Singaporean Indian 
devotees were also initiated by Prabhupada through mail.  It was customary for Prabhupada to 
initiate devotees in this way when he was in another part of the world.   One of them, who will be 
referred to as B. Das would play a key role in the next phase of the history of the Hare Krishna 
movement in Singapore. This batch of devotees, led by A. Das began by conducting weekly 
devotional programmes at his home in Gardenia Road.  In response to their efforts, Prabhupada 
wrote what was to be his final instruction for preaching in Singapore through a letter to A. Das, in 
May 1977: 
 I am very pleased with your activities there (Singapore) and advise you to go on 
with kirtan. You say there is a small community there taking part in kirtan and 
prasadam (food offered to Krishna) distribution, so try to increase it as far as 
possible, according to time and place in the situation you find in 
Singapore…..hold kirtans with your friends, read passages from my books, 
distribute prasadam and try to get more people to read the books….You don’t 
need to establish a temple, but gradually get funds and organize. 
Additionally, one of my respondents revealed that Prabhupada had told Bhurijana (who had come 
to Singapore in 1974) that the way to preach in Singapore was to set up a book shop selling his 
books and that the English educated Chinese Buddhist community should be especially targeted.  
 
Besides the handful of members who joined and a respectable number of books being sold, 
ISKCON had limited success in Singapore in terms of the number of recruits during this period. 
Global ISKCON at this stage could be described by Beckford’s model as having an external 
‘refuge’ relationship with society where, as adduced in chapter 3, NRMs disengage from society, 
and an internal ‘devotee’ relationship where members devote themselves fully to the promotion 
of their movements’ values, teachings, and material security. To join the movement usually meant 
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to join the temple, ‘shave up’ and become a ‘full-time’ devotee.  On the other hand Singapore 
was a young nation, fresh from independence from its colonial master and separation from 
neighbouring Malaysia, intent on achieving material success by educating and training its people 
for a fast paced industrial economy. The circumstances in the West such as the resentment over 
the Vietnam War and the frustration and disenchantment associated with industrialization were 
absent. Moreover, given that no temple had been established in Singapore and that Prabhupada 
and his army of American disciples were restricted in their movement, it was difficult if not 
impossible to apply the methods which proved to be highly successful in other parts of the world.  
 
5.3. The post Prabhupada era (1977- mid 1990s) 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the post Prabhupada years proved to be a difficult period for ISKCON. At 
the global level, controversies over succession, lawsuits, and dipping financial resources 
threatened to destroy the movement. The zonal acharya system where eleven disciples of 
Prabhupada declared themselves to be successor gurus for different zones had a negative impact 
as most of them were unable to maintain their vows and were forced to give up their leadership 
positions in disgrace. Akin to the histories of many religious movements after the loss of their 
charismatic leaders, ISKCON members formed factions. Some devotees were forced to leave the 
society either due to their non-compliance to the GBC or for associating with Prabhupada’s 
godbrothers. It will be shown that the movement in Singapore was not spared from the effects of 
these problems, rather they manifested in their own unique ways due to the particular 
circumstances emergent in the city-state. 
 
Some of the devotees attending the initial house programs in Gardenia Road wanted to adopt a 
strategy of propagating Krishna consciousness that was more analogous to Prabhupada’s methods 
in other parts of the world. This group, headed by B. Das, set up a centre in a house near Seletar 
Airbase and later shifted to Wellington Road. This was the first of several cycles of schism to 
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occur later. This group was unofficially recognized as representing ISKCON due to its orthodoxy 
and allegiance to the worldwide ISKCON movement and was overseen by a European zonal 
acharya GBC guru. By 1979, as in other ISKCON temples, some Singaporeans joined full time 
and lived in the centre. However the progress that was made was short-lived because in 1981, the 
then GBC-guru in charge of Singapore was found out to have violated his spiritual vows and then 
excommunicated from ISKCON due to various transgressions. As in other parts of the world, the 
‘falldown’ of the guru had a devastating effect on the congregation. C. Das, a devotee since the 
early 1908s described the situation as follows:  
I remember very clearly going to the temple one time and I was surprised, 
because usually there is a lot of vibrancy going on….but everything was all 
deserted and I saw some devotees there having long faces and I was asking the 
temple president  ‘what’s happening here?’ and he said they are just going to 
close down the temple.  I told him I want to buy some books. He told me just 
take whatever you want.  He didn’t tell me what happened.  Sure enough, I was 
one of the recipients of the zonal acharya system...I was given a picture of [x] 
Swami and told he is the acharya to bring you back to godhead. It was quite 
disastrous in the sense that practically all the devotees left. I know one particular 
devotee, he went to the middle of the sea and put his Bhagavatam set into the sea. 
Another devotee became a Pentecostal Christian and many of them just veered 
away from Krishna consciousness. 
A few devotees continued to pledge loyalty to the former GBC-guru and conducted programs in 
various places such as the Balasubramaniam temple which was in Sembawang at that time and in 
different houses. They even registered a society called ‘Prabhupada Yoga Meditation Centre’ and 
published newsletters and distributed several books. This group was especially successful in 
recruiting Chinese members, not least because its leader was a Chinese Malaysian.  
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In 1985, B. Das had returned to Singapore after serving as temple president in one of the 
ISCKON temples in the US. The new GBC guru for Singapore, an American Sannyasi, Tamal 
Krishna Goswami had persuaded him to revive the movement in Singapore and soon with the 
help of some local devotees who regrouped, a Hare Krishna centre was established, although 
ISKCON was not officially registered. Over the next decade, the centre shifted to various places 
like Sporttiswood Park, Thomson Road, Kampong Java and Bencoolen Street. This period also 
saw significant developments in the expansion of the movement in Singapore. From 1987-1989, 
the devotees set up a bookshop called ‘Govinda’s Gifts’ in Serangoon Plaza. One respondent 
revealed that the bookshop was instrumental in propagating Krishna consciousness to many 
people during this period. In 1989, a patron had offered the devotees a registered but defunct 
society called the Shiv Mandir to carry out their activities. They gladly accepted the offer and 
took over the society. Thus for some years, mainstream ISKCON was represented in Singapore 
through this society.  
 
During this time the zonal acharya system continued with Tamal Krishna Goswami. New 
devotees began to take spiritual initiation from him. However, tensions arose between the temple 
president, B. Das and the GBC as new initiates deferred their loyalty to their guru instead of the 
former.  Due to these and other personal differences, some of the disciples broke away from the 
Shiv Mandir and formed a separate group.  By 1987 the zonal acarya system was dismantled and 
replaced by a new system which allowed any one of Prabhupada’s disciples to become a guru as 
long as it was approved by the GBC. Thus aspiring disciples were not restricted to the guru of 
their choice by region.  Devotees therefore accepted initiation from various gurus who could enter 
Singapore freely without much restriction during this period.  Two new co-GBCs, Kavichandra 
Swami and Jayapataka Swami were appointed by that time after  Tamal Krishna Goswami 
resigned, citing more pressing duties in China as a reason.  
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A few attempts had been made to register ISKCON as a religious society in Singapore, but they 
had all failed.  C. Das who was the then vice president of the Shiv Mandir narrated how one 
particular attempt had worsened the relations between the state and the movement. In 1995, the 
devotees from Shiv Mandir managed to register ISKCON as a company, as opposed to a society. 
Then in 1996, the GBC in charge of Singapore, an American sannyasi, wrote to the Singapore 
Embassy in the US to persuade the Singapore authorities to allow ‘ISKCON Singapore’ to be 
registered as a branch of the international movement. ISKCON’s official magazine, the ‘Back to 
Godhead’ was sent along with the letter. When the Ministry of Home Affairs in Singapore 
received the petition, they noticed that in the list of worldwide ISKCON centres printed in the 
magazine, there was an entry for ‘ISKCON Singapore’ and the Shiv Mandir’s address was 
displayed. The Singapore officials were concerned that even before they had given approval to 
register the society, the devotees had publicised themselves as ‘ISKCON Singapore’. The ISD 
interviewed the president of Shiv Mandir about the issue and they had found out that the devotees 
had been giving out name cards with ‘ISKCON Singapore’ printed on it. When the devotees 
responded that they had registered ISKCON as a company, the state authorities instructed them to 
de-register ISKCON. They were allowed to carry on their activities under the auspices of the Shiv 
Mandir but were told not to allow any foreign preachers to visit. Respondents revealed that the 
ISD had also asked the devotees to change the name of the society as ‘they felt it was a 
misnomer’ since they were not devotees of Shiva. Eventually the name was changed to Sri 
Krishna Mandir after negotiation with the ISD.  According to a respondent who was the vice 
president of the temple, the authorities had also said that ‘they don’t want to see any young 
people joining the movement and people chanting on the streets like in the Western countries.’  B. 
Das, the president of Shiv Mandir subsequently communicated the ban on foreign devotees to the 
ISKCON GBC and ISKCON centres worldwide.  
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Despite the unofficial ban, devotees who had broken away from the Shiv Mandir by that time 
continued to invite their gurus to Singapore for devotional programs. These gurus and other 
preachers would dress in ordinary clothes to gain entry to Singapore. They were not always 
successful. One respondent narrated how his guru who had been wearing ordinary clothes was 
greeted by an immigration official (who had probably noticed his neckbeads) with ‘Hare 
Krishna.’ Thinking the official was a devotee, the guru returned the greeting by responding ‘Hare 
Krishna.’ He was promptly turned away. Other ISKCON sannyasis feeling that it was taboo to 
change out of their saffron robes, avoided Singapore altogether. This restriction on foreign 
devotees has continued to the present. One respondent reported that in 2003, an Australian 
ISKCON devotee and his family of six were refused entry into Singapore by officials at the 
immigration services desk. The officials, according to this devotee, said that they had been given 
orders not to let any ISKCON devotees into the country, and that they did not know why this 
directive had been given to them. Meanwhile strategies to avoid detection have continued and 
have become more complex as exemplified by the following anecdote of an Australian Hare 
Krishna monk visiting Singapore in 2005: 
I wore my saffron robes but did not wear my tilak (traditional Vaishnava marking 
on the forehead). Usually I wear a cap to hide my sikha (tuft of hair kept at the 
back of initiated ISKCON devotees) and for the past fifteen years I have passed 
through Singapore customs without any trouble, probably because they think I’m 
a Buddhist monk. My strategy is to not act suspicious and to look cool and calm. 
But this one time I did not wear my cap and for half an hour I was detained by 
the officials. They asked me ‘Are you a Hare Krishna?’ I replied, ‘No.’ Then 
they asked ‘what are you’ and I replied ‘I am a Gaudiya Vaishnava.’ They just 
wanted me to say that I am a Hare Krishna and then they would blacklist and bar 
me from entering Singapore. So I was determined not to say it. Usually I don’t lie 
and respect the law of the land but in this case I lied so that I may be able to carry 
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out my service. I see it more as a temporary law due to their misunderstanding of 
thinking Hare Krishna to be something evil. They tried some tricky questioning 
like ‘what is your philosophy?’ . Then they asked me to sit in a room and wait 
while looking at a TV screen. Somehow I knew they were watching me so I just 
kept staring at the TV instead of chanting on my beads.  Eventually they let me 
pass. The officers who interrogated me were not hostile; they were just doing 
their job (quoted in Sebastian and Parameswaran 2008, p. 69). 
 
The restrictions on the registration of ISKCON and entry of foreign preachers coincided with the 
third phase of religious management in Singapore where religion was ‘under the spotlight’ (See 
chapter 2). The prevailing disposition of the state at this time was that of concern over the 
perceived religious revivalism in Singapore. ISKCON devotees’ mistakes with the Back to 
Godhead magazine and registration of ISKCON as a company while operating as a religious 
society contributed to an unfavourable impression from the state. In fact the negative view of 
ISKCON was already echoed earlier by the Straits Times when it published an article entitled 
‘The curse of the cults – At least 15 Singaporeans lured into cults while studying or holidaying 
abroad’ and which carried a large picture of young Western ISKCON devotees chanting in public 
(The Straits Times, 26 July 1988, p. 11). The article espoused the views of American Anti-cult 
movements and included the usage of anti-cult terminology such as ‘brain washing’, ‘de-
programming’ and ‘indoctrination’. One respondent also mentioned that the disciples of a 
particular guru had been very aggressive in soliciting for funds in the early 1980s, so much so that 
local Hindu authorities alerted the state, which in turn blacklisted the movement.  
 
The strained relationship between the movement and the state was further exacerbated as a result 
of an incident which took place in 1989 when a group of South Indian Singaporeans objected to a 
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North Indian Hindu festival organised by ISKCON devotees, called Dussera.  One of the 
organizers of the festival recounted: 
The Dussera festival is held annually in North India, where they have a big 
effigy of Ravana and Kumbhakarna and they go up in flames. We thought we 
could have this festival in Singapore. It was a nice festival. The senior state 
counsel who was also a member of the Hindu Advisory Board was invited as a 
guest-of-honour. There was a very nice cultural program and exhibition. Ravana 
was burnt and there was alot of fireworks. Prior to that we wanted to publicize 
the festival in the Straits Times and there was an article written about it. But there 
was also a guy from the Tamil Murasu (a local Tamil newspaper) who came and 
interviewed me. He had asked me a lot of questions off the cuff. I would it say it 
was irresponsible journalism as he had written a lot of agitating things about 
Lord Rama - such as him not being worshipped so much in Tamil Nadu. The 
DMK (a powerful political party in Tamil Nadu) promotes Ravana because he is 
a Dravidian King. We had a discussion about how the DMK considers Rama 
shrewd. That’s not the correct understanding, Lord Rama is God and there is no 
such thing as north Indian god or a south Indian god. Unfortunately he had 
included all these things in the article. Some Indians who read it got agitated.  
But the North Indians loved it and said ‘Lets have a bigger festival, next year we 
will help you get a better place.’  After that the ISD called us up. They told us not 
to hold this festival anymore because it has agitated some members of the South 
Indian community.  We tried to explain our views but they said they were not 
interested to listen to our views…Unfortunately it has become a permanent 
exhibit for the ISD as an example of inter ethnic tensions. When I look at it, it 
has definitely been blown out of proportion…The interesting thing is that the 
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Nepalese community still has the festival in Singapore although it’s an in-house 
thing not a public festival. 
 
The article referred to above was published in the Tamil Murasu and gives an account of the 
festival based on the interview with the spokesperson of the Shiv Mandir and contains responses to 
the following controversial questions that were published as subheadings:  ‘Aryan or Dravidian?’ 
and ‘Isn’t Ravana a human too?’, ‘What’s the objective?’  and ‘Would it be appropriate for 
Singapore?’(Tamil Murasu, 14 October 1989). Another respondent claimed that he came to know 
that the South Indians who objected to the festival were actually Sri Lankan Tamils who were a 
small minority and that they had complained to the Hindu Endowments Board, the Hindu Advisory 
Board and the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
 
The second phase of the Hare Krishna movement in Singapore was characterised by another 
feature: poor relations with local Hindu organizations. One reason for this is related to ISKCON’s 
view of the status of gods (besides Krishna) in the Hindu pantheon which differs from  that of 
popular Hinduism in Singapore. ISKCON adopts the traditional Vaishnava practise of exclusive 
worship of Krishna or Vishnu and his devotees. Other popular gods in the Hindu pantheon like 
Shiva, Ganesh and Durga are regarded as ‘demigods’ or empowered servants of Krishna who 
perform a specific function in the management of the universe. The need to offer worship to the 
various demigods is subsumed by the worship of Krishna. Moreover according to ISKCON’s 
theology, those who worship demigods do so for temporary material benefits when they could be 
better off developing devotion to Krishna which would render permanent results. Prabhupada’s 
translation of a verse in the Bhagavad Gita reads: 
Men of small intelligence worship the demigods, and their fruits are limited and 
temporary. Those who worship the demigods go to the planets of the demigods, 
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but My devotees ultimately reach My supreme planet. (Bhagavad Gita As It Is 
7.23).  
According to some respondents, the application of this and other verses depreciating the worship 
of other gods induced many devotees to behave in a fanatic manner. D. Das, an elderly devotee 
who had attended programs since the mid 1980s said:  
 
The HEB (Hindu Endowments Board) labelled our Hare Krishna as a cult, not 
authorized. In one way our devotees made a mistake. According to our teachings, 
a devotee must respect all demigods. If you happen to go inside a temple you 
have to respect the deities. But many devotees, even if they happen to see the 
deities in the temple, they just ignore. This disturbed a lot of priests in the temple 
organisations. I was personally influenced before. Our family used to go to the 
programs in the Sembawang temple. After washing our feet, we didn’t care to see 
the Murugan deity inside. We would walk straight to our Krishna only. The 
priests always stood there and stared at us. Also during the class, they cannot say 
all ‘other gods are demigods, no need to pray (to them).’ I know there is no need 
to pray to them but we cannot say it openly like that. We still need to respect 
them because they are also part and parcel of Krishna. The HEB knows about 
this and it is because of this reason that ISKCON is not recognised. 
 
Another senior devotee recalled that in the 1980s, ‘the drawback was the local organisations. 
They (ISKCON devotees) never made any effort to reach out to them and as a result they 
probably have alot of misconceived notions of what the Hare Krishnas are all about.’ The 
controversy that arose out of the Dussera festival and the perceived intolerance of Hare Krishna 
devotees of popular Hindu practices did not serve the movement well, particularly because the 
state links intolerance to social instability.  
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 However respondents added that there were instances where leaders of Hindu organisations such 
as the Hindu Endowments Board and Hindu Advisory Board had attended ISKCON programmes 
and had cordial meetings with the devotees. C. Das said ‘Many of them (Hindu leaders) visited 
our temple. Some had visited our temples abroad and Mr. V.R. Nathan (former HEB Chairman) 
was impressed and said we should have a temple like this in Singapore.’  Furthermore in 1989, 
there was a joint program organised by ISKCON devotees and Hindu leaders, where the 
Bhagavad-Gita was recited for eight hours in the Srinivas Perumal temple. This event was also 
publicized in the Tamil newspapers (Tamil Murasu 30 January 1989).  Respondents also added 
that the Indian community in Singapore, especially the North Indians had donated generously to 
various activities organized by the Krishna Mandir.  
 
This phase also saw some attempts to implement some of ISKCON’s worldwide practises within 
the local context. C. Das recalled that the famous practise of chanting in public streets or 
harinama sankirtan was attempted in Orchard Road in the late 1980s. It received publicity in the 
local media:  
As far as street sankirtan is concerned, we had it twice in Orchard Road. In 1988 
they closed the streets once a month in the weekend and let you do whatever you 
want. We took that as an opportunity and had kirtan there. Our pictures came out 
in the Straits Times and Chinese newspapers. But after the second time, they 
thought ‘oh-oh we never thought these Hare Krishnas would be coming and 
chanting’ (laughs). So they stopped that and said from now on we will organize 
the activities. So that was the end of the harinam in Orchard Road. 
 
As mentioned earlier the ISD had cautioned the devotees about public chanting. The ban on street 
sankirtan is not confined to Singapore. In other places, like Melbourne, ISKCON devotees were 
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routinely arrested for street sankirtan before it was finally allowed. The other practice which is a 
significant aspect of ISKCON’s proselytizing activities is the distribution of Prabhupada’s books. 
Prabhupada would relish hearing about the scores of books that were sold worldwide and would 
repeatedly express his pleasure, which would in turn encourage devotees to go out and distribute 
more. In Singapore, a large number of books were distributed through book fairs and door-to-
door distribution especially in the late 1980s and mid 1990s. C. Das reported that at one time 
Singapore was the country with the fourth largest number of books sold in Asia. He said, ‘about 
150 to 200 books used to be sold on a daily basis and anything less than a $1000 worth of books 
sold was considered a disaster.’  The population density of Singapore and the close proximity of 
apartments in HDB estates were the likely factors contributing to this.  
 
5.4. The Hare Krishna explosion in Singapore (mid 1990s to the present) 
The third and current phase of ISKCON in Singapore has been characterised by an increasing 
fissure of congregations, greater integration with the Hindu landscape in Singapore and a boom in 
numbers due to the influx of devotees from South Asian countries. In the previous phases there 
were at most two large congregations, the Krishna Mandir and the Prabhupada Yoga Meditation 
Centre and one or two smaller groups which gathered in homes. However from the mid 1990s, 
this was to change as the devotee population continued to split into more groups. The increasing 
fractionalization was mainly due to differences of opinions on ideology and practise, having 
different gurus, personal differences and division along linguistic or ethnic lines. Fragmentation 
was facilitated by ISKCON not having the liberty to exist as a legitimate society in Singapore. 
Due to the non-existence of a central authority, devotees are free to break away from 
congregations and form their own groups without the stigma of defection as they can still identify 
themselves as ISKCON members to the international and local community of devotees. In 
another country where an official ISKCON body exists, there would be a lesser chance of this 
happening as the local GBC leader may mediate and try to resolve disputes, minimizing 
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fractionalization. If that had failed, those who stopped visiting the temple stood the risk of facing 
the stigma of being labelled as defectors or of having fallen from Krishna consciousness.  
Although ISKCON had assigned Singapore a GBC leader, his powers are limited as there is no 
common space where everyone congregates or a singular hierarchical line of authority by which 
he could communicate.  
 
One of the major causes of schism was the adoption of the ritvik doctrine by leaders of the 
Krishna Mandir. This doctrine, (referred to in chapter 3) asserted that ISKCON’s gurus were not 
authorized by Prabhupada nor qualified to serve in their positions and that Prabhupada had 
implemented a system where he was the sole initiating guru for present and future ISKCON 
generations of devotees. Disciples of ISKCON gurus who did not agree with this doctrine left the 
Krishna Mandir and joined another group which had begun holding regular programs in Hindu 
temples in Singapore, specifically the Lakshmi Narayan Temple. Currently, the Lakshmi Narayan 
congregation most closely resembles a typical ISKCON community due to its cosmopolitan 
nature of comprising disciples of different gurus and devotees of various ethnic and socio-
economic backgrounds. It is also one of the largest groups in Singapore with a regular attendance 
of about 100 devotees and up to 300 on major festival days. There are also other ISKCON groups 
which conduct their programs in various Hindu temples such as the Holy Tree Balasubramaniam 
Temple, the Srinivasa Perumal Temple and the Arasa Kesari Temple.  These groups are usually 
dedicated to a particular ISKCON guru and new recruits would usually be initiated by him. Some 
of these have numbers ranging from twenty devotees up to 200 and they mostly comprise of non 
Singaporean devotees from similar ethnic backgrounds. For example there are Bengali 
congregations made up mostly of Bangladeshi workers and professionals and South Indian 
congregations made up of Tamil speaking labourers and professionals. Including the Gaudiya 
Math, there are currently at least twelve such Hare Krishna groups in Singapore. Although 
relations among the different groups cannot be described as cooperative, they are mostly 
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respectful with the exception of the Krishna Mandir, whose ideological and personal differences 
with mainstream ISKCON congregations have resulted in acrimonious relationships and 
exchanges.  
 
A few respondents had expressed dissatisfaction with the fragmented state of the movement in 
Singapore. For example, E. Das and his wife who do not align themselves to any particular 
congregation but host fortnightly programmes attended by a small group of family and friends in 
their house, said: 
Its sad that there are so many factions in Singapore. It gives a bad impression to 
the public. People ask why there are so many groups among the Hare 
Krishnas...If the entire groups combine together, I’m sure they could organize, 
register ISKCON and even build a temple. 
To E. Das, the coalescence of the various groups is an essential step towards forging a lasting and 
respectable presence in Singapore. Others acknowledged that the movement is spreading widely 
and that the different groups are doing well but that it would be better if the devotees cast aside 
their differences and work as a unified institution. F. Das who had served in the Krishna Mandir 
since the early eighties but left in 2001 and now organizes programs in the Sri Krishnan temple, 
accepted the trend as part of the evolution of religious movements: 
As far as the different groups having different alliance to different gurus, what 
can be done? Everyone has got a different attraction to a different personality. If 
you look at the Christian Church there are so many churches and they all have 
got their own personalities whom they look up to. Everyone has got a particular 
faith. In the history of religious tradition it has always been like that. After the 
founder leaves there is always a split. Overall if we can just think in a more 
matured way and rise above all these things it will help. Sometimes I feel they 
don’t see it in that way. They see it more in their own small personality thing. 
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This is my group, this is my guru and we just take charge of ourselves. But at 
least its good when there is ratha yatra, all disciples of different gurus come 
together….If devotees can realise we have so many things in common - the holy 
name, Prabhupada, the same books, dhoti (traditional Bengali Vaishnava attire 
adopted by ISKCON members), tilak (religious marking on the forehead) - 
everything is the same and if we can keep our primordial sentiments then we can 
come together.  
One of the leaders of the cosmopolitan Lakshmi Narayana temple congregation, G. Das, felt that 
the splintering of different groups is not necessarily a negative turn and it ‘just needs tweaking.’ 
He said that since last year he has been holding regular meetings with leaders of some of the other 
groups: 
We call ourselves the Hare Krishna Council. We try to link up programmes.  
What we want to do is organise one major programme every year where 
everyone comes together. We want to start inviting each other for 
programmes...so that people can see there is no problem.  
H. Das, who is also a congregation leader and organizes weekly programs in the Arasa Kesari 
temple, had a positive outlook on the simultaneous presence of different groups:  
Many people have asked me, ‘you (ISKCON devotees) have many programs in 
other congregations’ I always respond ‘We are all one group. We have 
decentralized our programs for the benefit of people living across the island.  Its 
all the same brand. Like you have a KFC, or a McDonalds, all over they have 
McDonalds and KFC, just like that we have Hare Krishna all over the island.’  So 
it’s the same brand but different management, different corporate centres, but the 
material that you get is the same…..we should have many groups and many more 
centres to give the same brand….All programs are teaching the same philosophy 
under the umbrella of Srila Prabhupada’s ISKCON. 
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 From the 1990s, ISKCON devotees who had defected to Gaudiya Math had gradually established 
a noticeable presence. Currently three Gaudiya Math societies are registered in Singapore, the 
Gaudiya Vaishnava Society (2001), Sri Gaura Saraswathi Society (2003) and Caitanya Saraswat 
Gaudiya Math (2004), although not all of them are active. Members of the Gaudiya Math had also 
set up a vegetarian restaurant in Little India in 1999 which presently operates in Upper Dickson 
Road as ‘Gokul Restaurant’. Following suit, ISKCON members registered three societies from 
2007 to 2010 to serve as front organisations and in 2009 opened a restaurant.  The state’s 
approval of Gaudiya Math societies and other societies registered by ISKCON members while 
disallowing ‘ISKCON’ implies apprehension associated with the organisation.  This was 
confirmed by G. Das, who was interviewed by the ISD in the 1990s and had later registered one 
of the societies. 
Our Society, everyone knows we are Hare Krishnas, including ISD.  When they 
interviewed me in the 1990s, they wanted to know if we had any activities with 
foreign devotees. They were told that foreigners were coming to Singapore, 
foreigners were preaching without proper authority, licence or organisation. They 
wanted to know if we were funding them and whether we were sending money 
abroad… they explained to me that they were watching us, we are not registered 
but we seemed to be quite active and what is our relationship with the Krishna 
Mandir devotees…then they asked me why does Prabhupada mention the word 
‘spiritual communism’ in Isopanishad? Obviously they were well read… they 
said ‘we are not going to stop you from putting ISKCON on the map. But our 
suggestion to you is that you start by working the ground, get good grassroots 
support, do some communal activities, welfare activities. Get in touch from the 
net with other societies, get goodwill from society. Then you come and see us 
about ISKCON then we will look into it’. When we registered the Society, they 
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asked that we state in our constitution that this society is not a branch or affiliate 
of any international society. 
The ISD’s recommendations support my thesis that the state prefers and promotes a specific 
typology of religious movements described as ‘State Promoted’ in chapter 2. Religious 
movements which contribute to social stability by integrating themselves with established social 
networks and do not hamper economic productivity are ‘promoted’. G. Das also revealed that 
they secured external auditors to audit their accounts even though their society’s funds were far 
below the legal requirement so as to ‘stay above board.’  
 
Another issue that marks the third phase of ISKCON in Singapore is greater integration with the 
Hindu community through organizing programmes in Hindu temples and participating in 
activities with Hindu organizations. From the mid 1990s ISKCON leaders including the GBC, 
had encouraged local devotees to continue holding programs in Hindu temples ‘as it would be 
good for their relationship with Hindu community.’  At present, it is common for devotees to be 
invited to sing kirtan during festivals in Hindu temples where deities, including those not related 
to Krishna, are brought on processions to community centres or public void decks. While I was 
attending such a function at a community centre, another temple’s committee member who was 
impressed with the devotees’ kirtan approached me and asked if I knew the leader of the group so 
that he could invite them to sing in an upcoming festival in his own temple.  Once a month, the 
devotees from one of the societies participate in a three hour bhajan session organised by the 
Hindu Centre in the Perumal temple where residents of old folks’ homes are invited to participate. 
Various bhakti movements such as the Sai Baba Society are also allotted a slot to sing in this 
session. ISKCON members have also conducted regular talks in the National University of 
Singapore organised by the NUS Hindu Society since the mid 1990s.  
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In 2008, members of the Bengali congregation who had been given permission to conduct weekly 
programs at the Perumal Temple were asked to volunteer their services for a major festival where 
the deity known as Lord Balaji (a form of Krishna) from the famous Tirupati temple in South 
India was brought here. And again in 2009, they were asked to volunteer as marshals for the 
annual thaipusam festival.  Although the practices of thaipusam, which includes mortification of 
the flesh and worship of the ‘demigod’ Murugan contradicts with the singing and dancing for 
Krishna by ISKCON devotees, they agreed to volunteer. One of leaders of the congregation, I. 
Das said: 
We want them (HEB and Perumal temple) to know what we are doing…During 
the Balaji festival they invited us to do some service. They asked us to clean the 
temple. Our people, there is no need to train (them); they know how to do it. The 
temple authorities were very happy with us. Throughout the whole night, our 
people cleaned the temple, other groups left halfway. So during thaipusam they 
invited us again. We started at midnight on Saturday and worked til Sunday 
10pm. They know that these people are from ISKCON.  It has improved our 
relationship. Now they are vey happy to let us use the temple for subsidized rates 
and sometimes for free. 
J. Das, who is an active member in one of the societies, said that there was a need to repair the 
relations with Hindu organizations due to the damage done in the past. He also added that 
collaborative activities with Hindu organizations ‘gave us an opportunity to spread the holy 
names of Krishna…and wherever we have an opportunity, be it temples, community centres, 
birthday parties, house-warming or funerals, we will take it.’ G. Das described how the members 
of his congregation conduct themselves in relation to other Hindu groups during the three hour 
bhajan session organised by the Hindu Centre: 
We only have a half hour slot. We have a choice. We can come for the half hour 
slot and walk away and they (other Hindu groups) will think ‘these people are 
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always like that. They come, do their thing and go away’ or we could stay 
throughout and participate….we should never forget to respect the devatas 
(demigods). We don’t condemn them. We may take them as administrators of the 
universe, servants of the Lord. If we sit there and accept that by their mercy we 
are getting a chance to glorify Lord Krishna. We thank Krishna and we thank the 
demigods. 
G. Das’ adaptation of ISKCON’s philosophy to accommodate the situation in Singapore is typical 
as ISKCON members continually need to justify their actions to other devotees and to themselves 
using the scriptures and Prabhupada’s teachings as a basis. ISKCON’s teachings while retaining 
its Vaishnavite orthodoxy, allow flexibility for this. F. Das, who organizes his own programs at 
the Sri Krishnan temple voiced his support: 
I feel the present community of devotees in the Lakshmi Narayan temple are 
working very nicely with the Hindu Endowments Board and the Hindu Centre. 
They have a nice and friendly way of working. It goes a long way in establishing 
a good image. That’s what they (Hindu organizations) want to see. They want to 
see people who have got responsible jobs. They may have felt apprehensive 
when they see people are full-time devotees. But when they see that the Hare 
Krishnas are also working people and at the same time promoting religion, I 
think they are more favourable to working with them. That kind of approach 
would go a long way in making a better kind of image. 
 
However not all respondents agreed to integration with the Hindu community. B. Das, a leader in 
the Krishna Mandir said: 
We are the International Society for Krishna Consciousness. The founder is 
Prabhupada. He came to save the whole world. Why I should go and hide in 
somebody’s backyard? …and if I go to your backyard, I cannot preach openly. 
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The priests are worshipping so many demigods...can you tell people about 
demigod worship? You cannot. In fact you give the wrong impression. And once 
they look at our movement, they will think, ‘Oh, you all are little groups. You got 
no way of surviving. Therefore, you have come to us.’ Why should we give this 
impression? 
    (cited in Sebastian and Parameswaran 2008, p. 82) 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the association of ISKCON with Hinduism has been a recent 
phenomenon and the debate between those who support identifying and working closely with 
Hindus and those who are against it and insist on maintaining a separate identity is something that 
is taking place at a global level and is not specific to Singapore. However the lack of a temple 
(with the exception of the Krishna Mandir) amplifies the situation where devotees need to decide 
if they want to be aligned with Hinduism to be able to operate within the infrastructure that comes 
with it. 
 
Besides Hindu organizations and temples, leaders like G. Das have expressed the need for the 
Hare Krishna societies to engage with grassroots organizations and get connected with 
governmental organizations to forge a public presence. 
 
(We should) let them know we exist, let them know all we want to do is try and 
help the community…the Gita is the universal text adopted by Hindus, accepted 
by others, if we emphasize on the work aspects of the Gita, the welfare aspects of 
the Gita, we have found that we are getting better response. We have reached out 
to MCYS (Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports). One of the ministers was 
the guest of honour for the program in Hougang. We worked with the grassroots 
organisations to organise the entire program. We had a book table, prasadam and 
we had kirtan for two and a half hours. When you saw the devotees dancing for 
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one, two hours with Chinese MPs looking around, nobody would have though 
that this was an ISKCON programme in Singapore. What really helped was we 
pitched it as cultural program…..Even if we don’t register as ISKCON the 
activities are still going on in a very nice way. 
 
Likewise the members of the Krishna Mandir enhance their publicity by inviting ministers to their 
events. They advertise this prominently on their pre-event posters and post-event reports with a 
view to underscore their legitimacy. For example, after their ratha yatra in 2009, they submitted a 
report on a public Hare Krishna website entitled ‘Muslim MP attends Singapore Ratha Yatra 
2009’ (http://www.harekrsna.com/sun/news/07-09/news2830.htm). The Krishna Mandir also 
projects itself as a welfare organization, collecting funds for distribution of prasadam (sanctified 
food) to old folk’s homes and other needy people. They were granted the IPC status which issues 
its donors double taxation benefit (http://krsnamandir.blogspot.com/). The construction of the 
image of a welfare society is a response to the Singapore Government’s preferred role for religion 
(See chapter 2).  This is especially so as ISKCON’s ideology and practices do not emphasize 
social service but rather service to Krishna. The former is perceived to simply result in good 
karma which continues to bind the soul to the world whereas the latter awards liberation.  Some 
respondents from other congregations disapproved of the welfare label: 
 
We are not a charity society…Our business is to give the holy name. Prasadam 
distribution is already there.  We don’t want to do like Sri Krishna Mandir is 
doing or the Bangalore temple is doing…in terms of prasadam distribution as a 
social service. Prabhupada never said that. He said you should do prasadam 
distribution to everyone. These people are giving prasadam distribution only to 
the poor people or hungry people and they say please give donation, we are 
feeding the poor people. Its as if they are discriminating that prasadam is only 
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for poor people which is not right. Our branding is that we should distribute 
prasadam to the Prime Minister and pauper in the street indiscriminately because 
everybody needs the prasadam. It is sanctified spiritual food.  
(H. Das) 
The third major phenomenon associated with the current phase has to do with global patterns.  
The reason for the ‘Hinduization’ of ISKCON in North America and the UK has been attributed 
to the surge in the migration of Indian professionals who offer moral support and material 
assistance performing the role of patrons in Beckford’s typology (See chapter 3). This 
phenomenon has been replicated in Singapore where since the early 1990s, the city state 
encouraged an influx of professionals and labourers of South Asian descent (mainly Indian and 
Bangladeshi). The increasing number of Indian immigrants in ISKCON congregations in 
Singapore has lent weight to the credibility of the movement as a bona fide Hindu sect in the 
perception of the public and Hindu administrative bodies such as the HEB, which have thus far 
been dominated by a South Indian Shaivite version of Hinduism. Particularly, Bengali Hindus 
have an affinity to Caitanya and Prabhupada, both of whom were born in Bengal. Currently about 
400 Bengalis, most of who work in Singapore as labourers organize their own programs and have 
even set up a small temple in a rented apartment.  Interviews with them suggests that the weekly 
programs they attend provide them relief and rejuvenation from their harsh working conditions. 
One of their leaders, I. Das said: 
I tell them that if they were to spend their time and money on beer, so much 
would be wasted. But if once a week they attend our programs, they get free 
food, and they can chant and dance in ecstasy. And because of the spiritual 
recharging during the kirtan and the lessons in the class for the rest of the week, 
they will be peaceful and won’t get into any bad association. They also save a lot 
of money by not engaging in drinking and womanizing. 
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Most of the outreach to Indian immigrants occurs by word of mouth through other Indian 
immigrants who have been ISKCON members prior to coming to Singapore or taken to Krishna 
consciousness after their arrival. During festivals such as Janmastami (festival celebrating the 
advent of Krishna) and ratha yatra, special efforts are made to invite members of various ethnic 
Indian societies to attend. Thus as in other parts of the world, the migrant Indian community serve 
in a range of roles in ISKCON from devotee to patron in Beckford’s typology. However, one 
drawback of having congregations largely composed of expatriates is that they are transient. H. 
Das who is a congregational leader of about seventy devotees, most of whom are expatriate 
Indians narrated his experience:  
The problem I’m facing is that expats, they are here for only one to two years. 
They attend programs, become very nice devotees….then they finish their 
contract and they go back. They either go back to India or get a better job 
elsewhere. That’s why I said lets do the programs in the temples. Then also 
somehow the people who started coming were expats. 
 
H. Das went on to complain that it was difficult to reach out to Singaporeans ‘They just come, 
take darshan (offer respects to the deities), attend arati (worship involving the offering of various 
items to the deities), take some prasadam and then go off.  If you tell them the program lasts for 3 
hours, say six to nine, they think it’s too long.’  
 
Finally I conclude this chapter by discussing specific challenges faced by the devotees in 
Singapore in their attempt to implement some standard ISKCON practices. One of the most 
prominent symbols of ISKCON is the annual ratha yatra parade where the chariots of Jaganatha, 
Baladev and Subhadra are pulled along public roads in major cities of the world. The procession 
is accompanied by devotees singing, playing musical instruments and dancing. Prasadam and 
books are also distributed to members of the public. In some cities like Baltimore and London the 
 85
festival has become an annual carnival where the mayors have declared it as ‘Hare Krishna Ratha 
Yatra Day’ (http://news.iskcon.com, http://www.rathayatra.co.uk/kensmessage). In Singapore, the 
devotees have yet to succeed in organizing the ratha yatra on a such a large public scale as the 
state is unlikely to allow the blockage of  traffic and cordoning off of space that the festival would 
take up.  However they have progressed from having previously held it in isolated farms and 
within temple premises to conducting it in sports stadiums. From 2006, the Krishna Mandir held 
the festivals in Toa Payoh Stadium and in 2009, another society followed suit by organizing it in 
Bedok Stadium. Usually about a thousand people turn up for each of the chariot festivals. Further 
in 2008, members of this society organized the ratha yatra procession during the Hindu 
Thaipusam festival. In this way, ISKCON members are likely to continue to negotiate for greater 
public space. The Singapore Government on the other hand while keen to portray its commitment 
to multi-culturalism and multi-religiosity carefully guards against the use of public spaces by 
religious bodies to preserve its secularity and to appear fair to all religions.  
 
In July 2009, there was a much publicised dispute between members of the Krishna Mandir and 
the Singapore Armed Forces, one of the most powerful and authoritative organizations of the 
state.  Madan Mohan Das, a full-time monk and the son of the president of Krishna Mandir, had 
been detained for five days by the military police for failing to cut his sikha and for not eating the 
food provided by the Singapore Armed Forces during his National Service.  During the initial 
phase of basic military training, he was allowed to keep the sikha and eat the food that was 
delivered to him by the temple on a daily basis. However, this was stopped when he moved to 
another unit for further training. According to traditional Hindu practices, a priest serving in the 
temple is only supposed to partake of prasadam, wear a Brahmin thread and keep a sikha. In 
protest to the detention, a member of the Krishna Mandir had put up an online petition titled 
‘Hindu Priest Suffers Heavy Religious Assault During National Service in Singapore’ and 
claimed that Madan Mohan Das and his father were on a fast to protest his detention. Two days 
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lot of hardship to the Singapore 
government in the matter of the Hindu priest in NS’ and ‘to abide by the SAF's conditions on him 
in the best interest of the nation’ (http://www.thepetitionsite.com/2/help-save-madana-mohan-
Das). The Singapore Straits Times reported the issue and mentioned that the Krishna Mandir was 
‘a Hare Krishna temple’ and that Madan Mohan Das had dropped the protest only after ‘he found 
out that he could face three years in detention’ (The Straits Times, 27 July 2009). The Straits 
Times articulated the views of socially accredited experts who would echo the views of the 
government through the voice of a Mr. Shriniwas Rai, ‘the Hindu representative of the Inter-
Religious Organisation in Singapore’.  Mr. Rai claimed that Hindu priests can eat food prepared 
outside a temple, as long as it is vegetarian and then added that priests should be trained in India, 
and not everyone can claim to be a priest (The Straits Times, 27 July 2009). The case of Madan 
Mohan Das was widely debated on the internet, both in Singapore forums and ISKCON forums. 
Many ISKCON devotees from other groups in Singapore had disapproved of Madan Mohan Das’ 
actions. One devotee reacted by exclaiming that ‘12 years of goodwill had gone down the drain’. 
The popular opinion in the devotee community was that there was no need to make a fuss over a 
trivial issue, since Prabhupada had allowed his disciples to eat vegetarian food if prasadam was 
unavailable and that rules have to be practised according to time, place and circumstances.  
However, a small minority like L. Das supported the Krishna Mandir’s stance.  L. Das, although 
not a member of the Krishna Mandir, had written strongly worded letters to local newspaper 
editors protesting against Rai’s opinions on Hindu priests, SAF’s treatment of Madan Mohan Das 
and the way the articles were written. He did not receive any reply and his letters were not 
published. This incident is another blemish on the Hare Krishna movement in Singapore, and is 
likely to be raised as an example of religious fundamentalism in future speeches by state officials. 
In the Singapore brand of Hinduism, the acceptance of full time preachers represents a departure 
from established patterns of religious behaviour. As local ISKCON monks introduce new fields 
of religious practice they confront prevailing understandings of religious roles. These struggles 
 87
address not only individual circumstances and the needs of devotees but they also have an impact 
on wide ranging structural and ideological tensions within the Indian community.  
 
The lack of a temple is one of the outstanding features of ISKCON in Singapore. With the 
exception of the Krishna Mandir which is a breakaway group from the GBC-run ISKCON, 
devotees have had to adjust to the environment of the temples and halls where they conduct their 
programs. These environments are not always conducive but the devotees try to recreate the 
settings of an ISKCON temple by setting up altars in the programme venues. Some Hindu 
temples have been very welcoming. H. Das described that the Hindu temple presidents he 
approached were very cooperative: 
 so far there has been no restriction. In fact they were very happy to have 
programs here and were almost waiting for us.  We pay a very small rent to cover 
air-conditioning and lighting. We were also allowed to start cooking in the 
temple kitchen and use the temple’s chariot. 
It is likely that as the number of devotees increase, some of the larger congregations would 
attempt to establish a temple or a centre. In fact just recently in September 2010, one of the 
societies have started to rent and utilise a hall as center for daily devotional programs. The need 
for a temple was expressed by K. Das, ‘There is no single place to congregate. Here people are 
always running from one place to another…In a temple they can learn about ISKCON practices 
easily.’ Another consequence of a lack of a temple in Singapore is the large number of ‘house 
programs’. The sound coming from the musical instruments played during kirtan in these 
programs have sometimes led to complaints from the neighbours.  In these instances, the police 
arrive at devotees’ homes and request them to reduce the noise level.  To avoid this situation, 
some devotees make it a point to let their neighbours know in advance that they are hosting a 
programme in their house.  Despite the abovementioned constraints of not having a temple, most 
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of the leaders I interviewed seem content with the current status due to not having to worry about 
the costs involved in maintaining a temple or centre. H. Das said,  
 In the Singapore scenario, I don’t see many people joining the temple full time. 
We are not ready for the temple, with five aratis and full time brahmanas 
(priests). With temples there are overheads. Without overheads I am getting the 
same result. The idea of preaching is to make devotees. Whether you have a 
multi million dollar temple or whether you are preaching under the tree, the result 
is the same. It doesn’t make sense to put in so much cost to get so little output. Of 














Chapter 6: Conclusion 
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In the concluding chapter, I will summarize the main arguments in this thesis and analyse state-
religion interactions in Singapore by utilizing Goffman’s dramaturgical action theory and 
Gidden’s structuration model. Next, as one of the objectives of this thesis is to document the 
development of ISKCON in Singapore, I will evaluate the current status of the movement and 
outline the trajectory it is likely to take. Finally, I will identify scope for further research. 
 
6.1. Summary 
In chapter 2, I began with a historical overview of the relationship between the state and religion, 
rendered in a four phase chronology. It was shown that the state played an active role in 
managing religion whether it was in keeping religion in the background, foreground, under the 
spotlight, or in the danger zone. Over the years, the state developed an arsenal of tools to manage 
religion through various forms of legislation and media campaigns. In chapter 3, I posited that the 
state’s claim to neutrality is suspect and that the state accords preference to particular forms of 
religion, although not in an overt manner.  The religion management model was used to 
demonstrate this argument through instances mentioned in chapter 2 and by using examples of 
NRMs which enjoyed varying degrees of acceptance from the state. The NRMs’ relationships 
with the state were categorised as ‘state supported’, ‘state approved,’ ‘state monitored’ or ‘state 
repressed.’ Beckford’s framework of situating NRMs in the context of the relationship between 
movement and members and between the movement and host society was invoked to identify the 
characteristics of religious movements which correspond to a particular category within the 
religion management model.  From chapters 4 to 5, I focused on the example of the state 
monitored NRM: ISKCON. The philosophy, establishment, struggles and expansion of ISKCON 
around the world were described. These events and trends had an impact on the movement in 
Singapore as was shown in chapter 5. The history of ISKCON in Singapore was divided into 
three phases: the 1970s, late 1970s to mid 1990s, and from the mid 1990s to the present. The first 
phase had minimal impact in Singapore and any positive development was eclipsed by the refusal 
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of entry to the movement’s founder and his followers. The second phase was met with larger 
success through the establishment of local centres, a gift shop and a restaurant but was marred by 
foreign devotees being barred from the country and the prevention of ISKCON from being 
registered as a society. The third phase was named the Hare Krishna explosion in Singapore 
because of the increasing numbers of schisms amongst the groups and the increasing number of 
devotees, largely due to the influx of migrant South Asian professionals and workers. Next, I will 
revisit the strategies undertaken by ISKCON and other religious movements to enlarge their 
social and physical space given their constraints by discussing them in light of the symbolic 
interactionist school’s dramaturgical model. 
 
6.2. Dramaturgical Performances of state and religious movements 
Symbolic interactionism is useful for studying the relations between the state and religious 
movements. It illustrates how social reality is formed through interactions and performances by 
agents. It rationalizes changing, continually readjusting social processes by viewing agents as 
role-taking actors negotiating with one another to create temporary, socially constructed relations. 
These relations remain in a state of constant flux governed by a relatively stable framework. 
Goffman’s dramaturgical model uses the analogy of theatre whereby social behaviour is scripted. 
When agents interact with each other, they employ symbolic devices to ‘manage’ the impression 
others receive from them (Reynolds 1993, p. 96). Social behaviour is therefore a performance by 
actors whose objective is to control the impression others have of him/her (Goffman 1959, p. 15). 
Reynolds summarizes Goffman’s model as follows: 
 
Operating either in solo or in concert with their fellow actors and actresses as a 
team of players, people ‘stage shows’ or ‘give performances’ during which they 
‘read social scripts,’ ‘enact routines,’ and ‘play parts’ that utilize ‘props’ and 
‘settings.’ These are given in ‘front region,’ which is to say before an ‘audience.’  
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The performances are ‘prepared’ in society’s ‘back regions.’ During these 
moments of preparation, when one is not ‘on stage,’ opportunities arise for 
anticipating whether one’s performances will be well or ill received by the 
intended audience. The end product of a performance is the audience’s 
‘imputation’ of a particular kind of self to the ‘character’ being performed…. 
Audiences have certain expectations, and one thing they always expect is a 
minimal coherence among setting, appearance and manner (Goffman 1959, p. 
25). If such coherence is sustained, the audience may agree tactfully to accept the 
actor’s appearance as sincere, believable, or authentic. All of this interaction 
between actors and audience, between groups and between individuals, is a very 
delicate, temperamental, fussy business. Special techniques are needed to sustain 
a successful presentation of self: one personal slip, one faux pas, one misread 
cultural cue card, one social pratfall, and the self may have imputed to it an 
insincere, unbelievable, and unauthentic character’ (Reynolds 1993, p. 97). 
 
In the hegemonic city of Singapore, both the state and religious movements stage performances in 
the public sphere (front region). The state clearly defines its expectations and boundaries for the 
role of religious movements through the stage provided by the media and by the establishment of 
laws. In a bid to produce an image of fairness, the state claims to be neutral to all religions. In 
turn, religious movements which seek state approval strive to meet these expectations through a 
performance of charity work, inter-faith dialogues and other social welfare activities. The 
examples of SOKA and the Sai Baba movement and the corresponding high statuses they enjoy 
are testimony to this.  These state approved activities are carried out in the front stage of the 
movements’ expressed constitutions, websites, public programmes and so forth. As for the 
backstage, Goffman explains that the actor ‘can ready himself or herself for the next 
performance; in the back region, partially shorn of social costuming, the individual can be more 
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of himself or herself’ (Reynolds 1993, p. 101). In the case of many, though not all religious 
movements, the primary motive in the backstage is to expand and increase the number of 
followers. Simultaneously, in the back region of the state, the main motive is to harness religion 
to cultivate a population of subservient, hard-working citizens who contribute to economic 
development and social stability. These motives are of course not very palatable for the public 
stage so the state engages in ‘private’ operatives in the backstage, such as disallowing potentially 
threatening religious movement from being officially registered and barring their foreign 
preachers from entry. When coherence between the state and religious movement is negotiated, 
the latter enjoys a privileged position in the public space as one of the pillars of society, 
symbolized in the religion management model in Fig. 1 by the ‘state promoted’ quadrant. Such a 
movement’s views on controversial issues may even be sought out by the state and articulated in 
the media. Religious movements whose performances do not fit into the state’s ideal vision, due 
to fundamental differences of opinion on ideology or due to the acts of leaders and members 
would occupy other positions ranging from  ‘state approved’ to ‘state repressed.’ However, the 
positions are not definitive. They are subject to changes, as mentioned above, one ‘faux pas’ can 
breakdown the relationship between the state and the religious movement. The example of Madan 
Mohan Das’ protest during his national service and the subsequent loss of status of the Krishna 
Mandir from ‘state approved’ to ‘state monitored’ is one example of such a situation.  
 
The success of the performance depends on the tactful interaction between co-actors and/or 
audience. To prevent embarrassment and the disruption of the social process, actors often engage 
in what Goffman calls ‘impression management.’ This refers to the way that actors supervise 
their own performances to avoid being interrupted. If actors say or do something unsuitable to 
their performance, they may seek to redeem themselves quickly by saying or doing something to 
re-harmonize it. The Krishna Mandir put up an apology on the website in which it had previously 
petitioned against the SAF’s arresting of Madan Mohan Das. In another case in 2009 involving a 
 94
different religious tradition, a group of Christians orchestrated the takeover of a secular women’s 
rights group, AWARE due to the former’s perception that the latter were promoting pro-gay 
values. In response to the public outcry that followed, the National Council of Churches of 
Singapore (NCCS) and leaders of other religious groups issued statements to declare they did not 
support churches or religious institutions getting involved in the matter, and that the pulpit should 
not be used to promote such causes (The Straits Times, 15 May 2009). Subsequently, Singapore’s 
Minister for Home Affairs and the Prime Minister expressed gratitude for the responsible stand 
taken by church leaders’ (The Straits Times, 17 August 2009).  
 
The dramaturgical performances of the state and religious movements produce a relatively stable 
relationship over the long term and this in turn can be analysed using Giddens’ theory of 
structuration. According to Giddens, structures are made up of rules and resources governing and 
available to agents. In this case structure refers to the relationship that results from the 
performances of the agents of state and religious movements based on their knowledge of the 
rules. Resources for religious movements can refer to their members, financial resources, and 
places of worship and resources of the state refer to the media, and the executive powers of the 
state.  Agency is tied to structure in the sense that agents interact to produce and reproduce 
society in a recursive manner (Giddens 1984, p. 66). Agents have knowledge of their society and 
this mutual knowledge therein produces structures. Religious movements are aware of the rules of 
society and the resources available to them and perform accordingly. The resultant structures 
based on their interaction are mapped in congruence with the religion management model. At this 
point, we can merge the observations of Giddens and Goffman; religious movements seeking 
state approval perform in accordance with their knowledge of the rules of the state while in the 
backstage they elude the authorities by having ‘carved out unlicensed and unregulated spaces 
beyond the state’s reach’ (Rudolph and Piscatori 1997, p. 247). In ISKCON’s case, programs are 
conducted in houses and Hindu temples and foreign devotees by-pass immigration officials by 
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not wearing their devotional clothes. As for the state, it is aware of the constitutional rights of 
individuals to practise their religion and in the public stage makes a show of non-interference, 
unless of course laws are explicitly breached. In the backstage, the state embarks on various 
strategies to check the establishment and growth of the movement. This produces a double-
layered socio-religious landscape which is characterized on the outside by clear official divisions 
of Christian, Buddhist, Islam and Hindu denominations and a covert inner layer which 
encompasses the aspirations and interactions of the agents in the backstage. One possible 
consequence of such a social structure is the unsupervised and uncontrolled development of new 
religious movements, as exemplified by ISKCON’s case. Multiple ISKCON groups have 
mushroomed without the supervision and guidance of its official governing body. Moreover, the 
state is left with a tarnished reputation by ISKCON historiographers.  
 
One of the main criticisms of Goffman’s model is that he portrays social agents to be ‘nothing but 
an incorrigible pack of “con” artists engaged in a lifelong process of deceiving both self and 
others’ (Cuzzort 1969, p. 175).  Thus the self becomes a mere object ‘about which the actor 
wishes to foster an impression’ and agents alter their performances depending on their audience 
(Meltzer, Petras and Reynolds 1975, p. 69).  These criticisms cannot be applied in a general 
context to religious movements or the state because both have predetermined objectives or a set 
of ideals within boundaries which they may or may not choose to cross. At different times, they 
may emphasize certain aspects of their ideals or belief systems as part of the performance to 
construct a particular impression but they are unlikely to change their core beliefs, even if these 
beliefs are not compatible with the state or society. The Jehovah’s Witnesses in Singapore are an 
example of this. One of their core beliefs is to deny the sovereignty of the state, reflected by their 
refusal to undertake the compulsory military service required of male Singaporeans.  The result is 
that the members of the movement have negotiated a marginalized position for themselves in the 
‘state-repressed’ category in the socio-religious structure of Singapore where they serve a term of 
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military imprisonment and are banned from proselytizing and existing as an official society.  On 
the other hand, religious movements whose teachings and practices afford their followers greater 
flexibility to act within social norms are more likely to be able to gain greater social space in 
hegemonic states like Singapore. Therefore from the abovementioned examples it can be inferred 
that social agents of religion and the state are not merely engaged in a continuous process of 
deception, but rather they are constrained by their objectives and they can choose to adjust their 
performances in the context of these constraints. Some movements or some leaders within 
movements may choose to embark on a performance to gain a favourable impression from the 
state whereas others may not.  
 
As far as ISKCON is concerned, while the movement’s teachings are clear and unchangeable, 
there exists a degree of flexibility due to Prabhupada’s emphasis on ‘time, place and 
circumstances’  (Prabhupada 1999, Srimad Bhagavatam 4.8.54). Moreover the pre-ISKCON 
history of Caitanya’s movement has seen it operate and flourish under oppressive states. For these 
reasons ISKCON members can choose specific courses of action or performances which coincide 
with the state’s ideals, even if for different reasons. For examples, the state views the criticism of 
other religions as an offence due to its potentially disruptive consequences. From my primary 
research, I observed that some local ISKCON leaders who aim to gain wider acceptance from the 
state, promoted a more tolerant and cooperative attitude when dealing with people of different 
faiths rather than the more aggressive and argumentative approach of the movement’s early years. 
To support their view, one of them quoted a purport in one of ISKCON’s authorised scriptures, 
the Srimad Bhagavatam,  where Prabhupada writes:  
In Bhagavad-gita everything has been divided into three qualitative divisions; 
therefore religious systems are similarly categorized. When people are mostly 
under the modes of passion and ignorance, their system of religion will be of the 
same quality. A devotee, instead of criticizing such systems, will encourage the 
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followers to stick to their principles so that gradually they can come to the 
platform of religion in goodness. Simply by criticizing them, a devotee's mind 
will be agitated. Thus a devotee should tolerate and learn to stop agitation. 
     (Prabhupada 1999, Srimad Bhagavatam 4.22.24) 
 
However, the same cannot be said of all ISKCON groups. The Krishna Mandir for one tends to 
adopt an doctrinaire approach as shown by their conflict with the Singapore Armed Forces and 
their refusal to participate in activities with other Hindu temples. A number of ISKCON members 
from other congregations who were interviewed are critical of Krishna Mandir’s actions, 
particularly the temple president’s behaviour which they deem to be fanatical and which they 
blame for the state’s negative impression of the movement.  They are learning from his 
performance and the resultant impression he has formed, and accordingly adjusting their own 
performances to forge the future of ISKCON in Singapore.  
 
It is likely that the increasing numbers of Singaporeans and Indian immigrants drawn to the 
movement will cement ISKCON’s position in Singapore. This is in tandem with ISKCON’s 
growth at the global level where it is undergoing rapid evolution from an NRM to a mainstream 
religion. Most likely, the groups which are able to maintain a balance of a front stage 
performance of meeting the state’s expectations of religious movements and simultaneously 
remaining faithful to Prabhupada’s teachings are the ones that are likely to establish themselves in 
the long run. This is because such groups would have been granted the social and physical space 
by the state and at the same time would have gained the confidence of congregation members as 
an authentic representation of Prabhupada’s movement, minimizing fractionalization. In this way  
ISKCON may shift from a ‘state-monitored’ position to a ‘state-approved’ position. As Giddens 
says, social structures are neither inviolable nor permanent; agents have transformative power 
(Giddens 1984, p. 88). The extent and shape of transformation depends on the movement’s 
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relationship with the state and the type of relationship with members. Based on Beckford’s 
framework, ISKCON groups which cultivate an ‘adept’ relationship with members and 
‘revitalization’ relationship with the society, while producing an impression of working within 
the status quo of religious movements in Singapore are likely to establish and expand. This 
particular profile coincides with present day ISKCON’s global image and is unlikely to meet with 
much internal or external resistance. The above mentioned prognosis is based on the assumption 
that the current political climate in Singapore more or less remains the same.  
  
6.3. Future research 
This thesis has paved the way for a number of questions which could be explored in future 
research on the socio-religious landscape in Singapore. The most pertinent one is that the views 
of the state on its policies for the management of religion and specifically ISKCON remain 
unknown. Due to not having been allowed to interview state officials, the perceptions of the state 
in this thesis have been derived from official speeches, policies, actions, and interviews of those 
affected by these. A more accurate picture would be rendered by primary research on the state’s 
standpoint. Secondly, the experience of ISKCON suggests that religious movements in 
Singapore, old and new, have their own stories to be told. Each of these movements may have a 
significant actor, with whom they wrestle for survival. This actor may not necessarily be the state, 
and could be other social groups like religious groups, gay rights activists or ethnic movements.  
Fine grained pieces of ethnographic research on the history and experience of these religious 
movements would be welcome. Thirdly, where ISKCON is concerned, this thesis has only given 
a surface level view of the movement because of the focus on the state-ISKCON relationship. An 
in-depth survey of member’s profiles, their reasons for joining the movement, and the negotiation 
of their identity and interactions in other social spheres such as the family, and workplace and 
their role in the international community of devotees would be necessary to paint a holistic 
picture of the lives and contributions of the first and second generation devotees in Singapore.  
 99
From my fieldwork, it has been observed that Singapore based ISKCON devotees although not 
having a temple of their own have had significant roles to play in the construction and 
maintenance of temples abroad, especially in India. Finally, I have not researched the 
relationships between members of different factions within ISKCON although I have alluded to it 
in some parts of the thesis. Although it is sensitive information and probably difficult to research, 
this is pivotal to the future of the movement. In one sense, researching ISKCON in Singapore has 
been like researching different NRMS simultaneously because of their differences in membership 
profiles and operating strategies. It would be interesting to see if and how the different groups 
converge to work under the umbrella of ISKCON should the movement eventually be officially 





Acharya – spiritual and managerial leader  
arati  - worship involving the offering of various items to the deities 
bhakti yoga – devotional service 
brahmanas  - priests who practise the highest standards of purity and conduct mentioned in the 
scriptures 
darshan – seeing and offering respects to the deities 
dharma -  duty 
Dussera -  festival which celebrates the homecoming of Rama the hero of the epic Ramayana, 
after his victory over Ravana, the king of Lanka.                                       
Janmastami - festival celebrating the advent of Krishna 
jiva – living entity or soul 
Kali yuga  -  the present and most irreligious age  of four cyclical time phases  
krishna prema - love for Krishna  
kirtan – singing of Krishna’s names accompanied by musical instruments 
ratha yatra – chariot festival of Jaganatha (Krishna), Baladev and Subhadra are pulled along 
public roads in major cities of the world. 
sanatana-dharma - eternal occupation of the living entity 
Sankirtan – congregational chanting of Krishna’s names 
sannyasi – renunciate monk and highest amongst the four vedic spiritual orders  
sikha - tuft of hair kept at the back of initiated ISKCON devotees 
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Appendix I: Interview guide  
 
This guide was used to assist the interviewer. The questions below may not have been asked 
in the following order and were meant to help the interviewer ensure that all aspects have 
been covered.  
 
Questions related to the respondents background 
1. How old are you? 
2. What is your current occupation? 
3. How long have you been a devotee? 
4. Which group’s programs do you attend regularly?  
5. What type of services have you performed for the congregation? 
 
Questions related to the interaction between state and ISKCON 
1. What according to you is the history of the movement in Singapore? 
2. Has the movement has faced any obstacles in Singapore? If so, what are they and how 
were the handled?  
3. Did you face any obstacles as an individual when practicing your religion in Singapore? 
If so, what are they and how did you overcome them? 
4. How do the devotees in Singapore proselytise?   
5. Are you satisfied with the current status quo of the movement in Singapore? If no, what 
would changes would you like to see? 
6. What do you think is the strategy for the movement to spread successfully in Singapore? 
7. How do you see the future of the movement? 
8. Do you consider yourself a Hindu? If so why? Or why not? 
9. Do you identify yourself as a Hindu to the public? If so why? Or why not? 
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Appendix II: Anecdote of a foreign  sannyasi’s experience in Singapore   
 
[The following is an excerpt from the blog of an American ISKCON monk who had visited 
Singapore in early March 2010 and was scheduled to give a three day discourse at the Lakshmi 
Narayan Temple.  As I have mentioned in this thesis, Singapore receives foreign preachers 
regularly due to its geographical location. At present, some of them, especially the Indian ones 
pass through the immigration checkpoint in devotional attire. This indicates that the immigration 
officials are not very stringent in barring foreign ISKCON devotes. Like members of many 
religious groups, the devotees did not go through the hassle of applying for a professional visit 
pass required for foreigners who speak on religion, partly because they are given very short notice 
of who is passing through and also because the programme is not exactly a public talk as it was 
not advertised and was catered to an internal audience. A group of eight to nine plainclothes 
policemen had arrived during the programme. The ensuing events are narrated by the Swami 
himself. I did not discuss the incident in the main body of the thesis as it had taken place while 
the thesis was being sent for printing; nevertheless it is sufficiently significant to be attached as an 
appendix.]  
 
We did programmes here and there around Kuala Lumpur until March 3rd, when I flew to 
Singapore. I was meant to stay there till the 6th and do programmes on each of the three evenings. 
The first programme, on the 3rd evening, was at the Laksmi Narayana temple, having been 
arranged by Devakinandana prabhu, a disciple of Mahavishnu Goswami, who passed away a few 
weeks ago. 
It was a nice programme with maybe 50 devotees, and we continued the theme of the appearance 
and pastimes of Lord Caitanya. At the end I was distributing cookies to the devotees, when 
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someone told me, “The police are here. They want to know who you are and what you’re doing 
here.” 
This was quite a shock, as I was well aware that the police in Singapore are very strict about 
everything, including having public gatherings. Actually for many years they have also been 
opposed to ISKCON, due to the foolish activities of the previous ISKCON temple president here, 
who is now a fanatical ritvik person, and who tries to upset ISKCON programmes whenever he 
can. Previously, when he was in ISKCON, he would report devotees to the police if they did 
anything he didn’t like, and this included Tamal Krishna Maharaja, who was banned from visiting 
Singapore, Gaura Govinda Maharaja and Lokanatha Maharaja, who was thrown out of the 
country as he tried to enter at the airport. 
Actually they are so bad that they would not even allow Srila Prabhupada to enter. He had to sit 
in the airport for 10 hours, even though he had a visa, but then they finally refused to let him 
enter, and he had to continue on to Australia without being able to take a break. 
There were seven plain clothes detectives, so it seemed they were taking it very seriously. My 
mind was racing. What is this going to mean? I thought. Are they going to arrest me? Will I be 
blacklisted? However I got a message that Devakinandana was speaking to them, and it seemed it 
would be settled quickly, so I could go upstairs and take prasadam with the other devotees. 
Unfortunately that message was too optimistic, and the next thing that happened, while we were 
upstairs, was that they wanted my passport, which I didn’t have with me. It was at the flat I was 
staying in. We SMS’d my passport number and so on to Devakinandana prabhu, who was still 
with them, and got the message back that everything was all right. The police were satisfied and I 
would not have to worry about anything. 
Unfortunately that also proved to be overly optimistic, and eventually, when everyone had 
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finished prasadam I was still waiting upstairs with a few devotees, waiting for word from below. 
Finally the word came. Everything was all right. All I had to do was walk downstairs, past the 
police, get in the car, and I could go. So we tried to do that. 
Unfortunately that also proved to be too optimistic. The police didn’t speak to me, but they told 
the devotees I had to wait in the car, and I couldn’t go anywhere. From now on the devotees 
stopped making optimistic predictions about the police letting me go, and it seemed clear that the 
point in their minds now was whether to arrest me or not. They were asking, “who is Bhakti?” 
and I understood that was me. They had come specifically looking for me! 
Finally, an hour and a half later, after they had made many phone calls and talked to each other 
many times, they said I could go, but that Devakinandana prabhu had to go to the central police 
station with my passport and make a statement and let them make a copy of my passport. 
Unfortunately that was too good to be true also, and about half an hour later we got a phone call 
from their leader that I had to come to the station also. 
So at about midnight Devakinandana prabhu and I reported in at the central police station in 
Singapore and were questioned by a youngish detective for nearly three hours. Some people 
senior to him had put him on the case, and he had to take statements about the whole matter in 
writing from us. It actually seemed that he was quite bored with the whole thing, so he didn’t do 
anything radical like put us in different rooms and try to catch us out or anything like that, but it 
was clear that his seniors had a particular idea of what had happened, and had asked him to 
question us in particular ways. 
Their idea was that this was a public programme, which had been advertised, and was intended to 
bring in new people and get them involved etc. In other words it was a preaching programme. We 
were proselytizing. Just what the government in Singapore hates. Of course we do programmes 
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like that all over the world, but in this case the programme was an invitation only gathering of 
existing devotees, so we had to get this through to the detective, which took a long time, but 
finally he got the message. 
At first he asked me how long I was staying in Singapore, and I told him I was leaving on the 6th 
to go to New Zealand, and he said that he didn’t know if I would be able to leave. That sounded 
really ominous. Then he asked me if I had another name. Under those circumstances I would 
normally say I don’t, and just stick with my karmi name, but I remembered hearing the other 
officers talking about “Bhakti” and I assumed they were talking about me and not about the 
process of devotional service, so I immediately told him, “Yes, I also have a Hindu name. Bhakti 
Caitanya Swami.” 
He didn’t quite get it, so we had to repeat it a number of times, and then write it down for him. 
But when he looked at it, something clicked in his mind. He said, “Oh, are you the same person 
as in this advertisement?” We were quite stunned. He pulled out a printed copy of the email 
Devakinandana prabhu had had sent out to our congregation, informing them of our programme, 
which said I was the main guest. One of our own people had given them this! Who could it be? 
Some of our own devotees were spying on us! 
Sometimes when we enter very extreme countries, like Muslim countries, we have to disguise 
ourselves and say we’re businessmen or whatever, and carefully hide that we’re devotees. If I had 
tried to deny I was BhaktiCaitanya Swami then I would probably be writing to you from the 
prison in Singapore right now, but fortunately Krishna let me know to say the correct thing. 
So finally after 2.30 in the morning the detective told me I could leave the country on the 6th, but 
after all this the devotees and I decided I should just get out immediately, before the police get 
any further bright ideas. The “crime” was really Devakinandana prabhu’s. He had organized a 
programme with a foreigner, without getting permission from the government. In the future he 
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had to apply in writing and get permission, and then everything would supposedly be all right. 
For the time being the detective told himthat it would take two weeks to figure out if they 
would charge him or not. They might imprison him, or fine him, or just give him a warning. 
The next day, from Kuala Lumpur, we called Devakinandana prabhu and he told us they had 
contacted him again and asked for a full list of everyone who was at the programme, and a 
recording of what I had said. They were really into it! 
Anyway, I stayed on in Kuala Lumpur and did some more programmes there, and then on the 6th 
I flew to Auckland, where I am now. Every year I try to visit my mother, who is 91, and give her 
some Krishna consciousness, as she and my late father were always very supportive of my 
involvement in ISKCON, and often donated money for me to use in devotional service. Now she 
is in hospital and is obviously not going to live a very long time, so I’ve been trying to give her as 
much prasadam as possible. 
Today I showed her a slide show on my computer of the different places I go in my travels, and I 
showed her Srila Prabhupada’s puspa samadhi in Mayapur. “This is a monument for Prabhupada” 
I told her. “Oh, Prabhupada!” she responded. It was pretty good considering she can hardly talk. 
Now she’s immobile, but previously when she was in a retirement village I would visit and stay 
in a flat there, and go for walks with her. She had a standard route she would take, and at one 
point on the way there was a strip of the footpath which had been dug up and then resurfaced, and 
when the concrete was setting, someone had written in large letters in it “Krishna”. My mother 
had pointed this out to me and told me, “Every day, when I walk over this I see Krishna and I 
think of you.” 
Today I took her some mangala arati sweets and some other maha prasadam, which she nibbled at 
with great relish. So let us hope that by the mercy of the Lord in the form of His holy names and 
 119
 120
prasadam, she gets a good destination shortly. 
On Sunday the 14th I fly back to Kuala Lumpur, and from there on the 15th to Bali. I will write 
shortly further. 
Hoping this meets you well. 
http://www.caitanya.org/wordpress/?p=361.   
